Statecraft, Trade and The Order of States by Patterson, Dennis M.
1Statecraft, Trade and The Order of States
Ari Afilalo and Dennis Patterson1
1
 Associate Professor of Law and Distinguished Professor of Law and Philosophy, Rutgers University 
School of Law – Camden.  The order of the names of the authors of this article is arbitrary.  We wish to 
thank the faculty of Brooklyn Law School for the opportunity to present a draft of this article at a 
workshop.  The ideas herein were first presented in December, 2004, at a conference on The Future of the 
WTO, Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv, Israel.  We thank Andrew Halpin, Claire Kelly, and Jefferson White 
for comments on drafts of this work.  Thanks to Philip Bobbitt for helping us see the big picture early on in 
this project.  Research assistance was provided by Justine Kasznica and Juli Schwartz. 
2Introduction
In 1989, Francis Fukuyama announced “the end of history.”2  This was not the 
first time this bold claim had been made, for Hegel had argued as much about Napoleon’s 
victory at Jena in 1806.  But Fukuyama was not declaring the triumph of the state-nation, 
as Hegel had done.3  Rather, he was saying that the great struggle between democracy, 
fascism and communism was over.  After defeating the Axis in World War II, and 
following the fall of the Iron Curtain, Fukuyama believed that democracy had triumphed 
and would, henceforth, be the preferred model for State4 government.5
It now appears that, like Hegel, Fukuyama was mistaken in his claim for the end 
of history.  While it is true that democracy defeated fascism and communism in the 
ideological struggle for political dominance, the State as we know it continues to evolve.  
History has not ended.  The story continues, and as has been the case before it is only the 
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, THE NATIONAL INTEREST 3-18 (Summer 1989).  As he had for 
so many intellectuals of his generation, Fukuyama’s Hegel came by way of Alexandre Kojeve.  For 
discussion, see SHADIA B. DRURY, ALEXANDRE KOJEVE: THE ROOTS OF POSTMODERN POLITICS 179-198 
(1994).
3
  The state-nation is the constitutional manifestation of the state that is characterized by a mobilization of a 
nation, that is, "a national, ethnocultural group" to benefit the State. See infra note 4. This form of the State, 
exemplified by Napoleonic France, dominated Europe and America in the 19th Century and ultimately 
gave rise to the nation-state with the advent of World War I. For a general description, see PHILIP BOBBITT, 
THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 146, 144-204 (2002).  
4
 We use the word “state” in two different senses. When we write “State,” we are referring to the political 
entity that has evolved in the Western world over roughly the last 500 years.  See J.S. MCCLELLAND, A 
HISTORY OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 280 (1996) (dating the birth of the modern state in 1500).  The 
State is composed of many “states,” like Italy or the Republic of Latvia.  When we refer to these individual 
states, we refer to them as a “state.”   For discussion of the various phases of the State’s development, and 
their relation to a variety of constitutional orders, see BOBBITT AT 69-347.
5
  According to Fukuyama, the liberal democratic model soundly beat fascism and communism because, 
simply put, it was a better idea.  It had no problem besting the fascist ideology of expansionism and racial 
superiority.  In time it demonstrated the untenability of the Marxist idea of class struggle because the State 
that Fukuyama wrote about was legitimated by its enablement of the welfare of the nation, and the growth 
of a strong middle class had radically changed the social reality in which Marx wrote.  In the end, 
Fukuyama argues, all good government would be organized along the lines of the liberal democratic model, 
applied to govern an ethnic or otherwise discrete nation that would protect the rights of minorities.  See 
Fukuyama, supra note 2, at 3-18.
3nature of the State6 that is changing.7  Identifying these changes, gauging their 
significance, and evaluating their relationship with respect to other features of the 
relations between states is central to understanding how and why the State continues to 
evolve.
Recent scholarship on the State has largely focused on foreign policy, that is, the 
“strategic” aspects of the relations between states.8  One of the more interesting claims in 
this regard is that the very nature of the State (what we call Statecraft) has evolved in 
response to developments unique to the twentieth century.9  These developments, which 
include the commodification of weapons of mass destruction and the diminished 
importance of sovereignty,10 have engendered a new approach to strategy.11  From the 
6
 The State is both a political institution and an idea.  Two of the defining features of the modern form of 
the State –sovereignty and control of power – are connected to two larger dimensions of the State, which 
we will call the inner and the outer.  The most obvious aspect of sovereignty is control over geography.  
Sovereignty is an attribute of “states” and sovereignty matters most in relations between states. See G.W.F. 
HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 331 (T.M. Knox trans. 1977)  (“[E] very state is sovereign and 
autonomous against its neighbors.”).
7
 Some see the end of the State marked by a transition to other, more complicated organizing forms.  See 
MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE vii  (1999) (“Globally speaking, the 
international system is moving away from an assembly of distinct, territorial, sovereign, legally equal states 
toward different, more hierarchical, and in many ways more complicated structures.”.  See also ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 32 (2004) (“The conception of the unitary state is a fiction.”).  
8
 See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
(2003); ROBERT COOPER, THE BREAKING OF NATIONS: ORDER AND CHAOS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2003); PHILIP BOBBITT, supra note 3, AT 5-17.
9 PHILIP BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 677-714.  The five developments are: (1) an international system of trade 
and finance that promotes exchanges of goods, and talent, and the free movement of capital; (2) threats that 
do not observe national boundaries (e.g., AIDS and SARS); (3) loss of state control over culture; (4) 
commodification of weapons of mass destruction; and (5) a global system of human rights which imposes 
legal rules on nations that have not been ratified by the nation-state.
10 For discussion, see, K.J. Keith, Sovereignty at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Fundamental or 
Outmoded? 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 581 (2004).  For discussion of sovereignty in the context of the WTO, 
see KENT JONES, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE WTO? 92-104 (2004).  A strong defense of sovereignty in the 
context of international law and constitutional government is found in JEREMY A. RABKIN. LAW WITHOUT 
NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005).
11 See Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 
(2004) (arguing for pre-emptive military action in a world of global terrorism and WMD).  See also
4perspective of strategy, this development requires us to rethink the basis for the State’s 
claim to legitimacy in the 21st century.12  Given its importance, it is no surprise that many 
scholars have devoted their attention to changes in strategy and their relation to the 
continuing evolution of the State.13  We agree that the State is changing.  We further 
agree that these changes require a rethinking of strategic defense in a world of 
asymmetric warfare and global networked terrorism.14  We do not intend to add to the 
literature on strategy, however.  Our project draws upon this literature, but is distinctly 
different.
Our project examines the extent to which the global trade system15 should respond 
to fundamental shifts in the nature of the State and of international relations.16  Our thesis 
is that, much like the strategic and foreign policy of states is linked to their internal 
constitutional order,17 the trade policy of states is another external dimension of the State 
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 98 (2004) 
(“[T]he existence of WMD in the hands of non-state actors poses a new and extremely severe type of 
security problem that would almost certainly justify intervention on the part of a country threatened in that 
manner.”).
12
 Legitimacy is an historical achievement.  See BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 207 (“[H]istory is the medium by 
which the legitimacy of the constitutional structure is married to the success of the strategy of the state.”).  
ROBERT COOPER, supra note 8, at 149  (“In the end, durable and reliable peace depends on creating 
legitimacy.”).
13
 See ROBERT COOPER, supra note 8, at 3 (“What has been emerging into the daylight since 1989 is not a 
rearrangement of the old system but a new system.  Behind this lies a new form of statehood . . . .”). 
14
  See, e.g., PHILIP HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 37-87 
(2003) (discussing terrorism, intelligence, and “war” after 9/11). 
15
  By the “global trade system” we mean the structures and practices of the GATT/WTO.  See generally, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (last visited April 6, 2005). 
16
 For discussion, see GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION (Miles 
Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003); JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (Victoria 
Elliot trans., 2000); KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES
(1995). 
17
 The “internal constitutional order” is expressed through law, both public and private. BOBBITT, supra 
note 3, at xxiii. 
5and also connected to the State’s inner order (law).  The experience of the 20th century 
shows that states must acknowledge overarching structural changes within their domestic 
spheres, then identify in a timely fashion how these shifts affect their interaction with the 
rest of the international economic community.  In turn, states must adjust `external trade 
policy objectives and strategies of the international community to accord with their 
intrinsic political and ideological goals. The failure to do so at the appropriate time will 
hamper the internal economic health of states and may also hamper free states in 
existential struggles against totalitarian movements.18
Our article proceeds in three principal parts.  In Part I, we provide a detailed 
defense of the claim that history has not ended and, further, why the State continues to 
evolve in the twenty-first century.  We identify the modern states of the 20th century as 
nation-states.  These states were born out of the prior evolutionary stage of the State, 
during which the State sought to solidify itself by drawing on its subjects as a supportive 
bloc and, in the process, created the nation whose welfare and security became the 
legitimating basis of the State.  Modern states maintained security vis-a-vis one another 
through a balance of powers.19  They used law to foster the welfare of the nation.  While 
Europe and the United States, among others, took different routes to welfare, the welfare 
systems of the modern states had as their common denominator a commitment to the 
18
 While we do discuss many events, both current and historical, this is an essay about ideas.  Mindful that 
“[i]deas are always both lagging and leading indicators of reality” (H.W. Brands, Ideas and Foreign Affairs
in A COMPANION TO FOREIGN RELATIONS 1-14 (Robert Schulzinger ed., 2002)), we attempt to get ahead of 
coming events and anticipate those events with ideas that will accommodate a future toward which the 
states that comprise the world trading system are already moving.  
19
 For discussion of balance of powers and a defense of  “Offensive Realism,” see JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, 
THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001).
6nation as the basis for their legitimacy.20  We posit that, in the 21st century, the modern 
states are being replaced by post-modern states.  There are several reasons for this, 
including the inability of states to maintain the provision of welfare as a legitimating 
basis and to guarantee security when confronted with global networked terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation of diffuse threats.
Part II argues that, just like law and strategy evolve through an interdependent and 
dynamic relationship, Statecraft and the international commercial order of states 
engender each other’s evolution.  The domestic constitutional architecture of the State,21
such as its organization around a nation and its legitimization through the promotion of 
that nation’s welfare, have profound repercussions on the ordering of the international 
trade system. At the same time, shifts in the foundational rules of the international trade 
system and in patterns of international economic activity (such as the rise of a new set of 
international economic actors or transformations in currency markets) affect the ability of 
the State to maintain its domestic statecraft and tend to transform the inner order of the 
State.  Like Jacob’s ladder, the State and the order of states are animated by a constant 
interaction going from bottom to top, and vice versa, in a dynamic motion that shape both 
spheres and, in turn, propels them forward through various stages of history.  Just as  
Fukuyama and Hegel were misled into thinking that strategic and political history ended, 
theorists of trade might misinterpret a historical transformation of sufficient significance 
as sounding the end of trade history.  In truth, however, the story continues.
20
 A recent discussion is found in Arthur Waldron, Europe’s Crisis, COMMENTARY, __-__, July-August 
2003.
21
  We will explain below the meaning of constitutional choices, as used in this context.
7We support our theory in Part II by an analysis of the relationship between trade 
and the State over the course of the last two world wars, culminating with Bretton 
Woods.  We explain why Bretton Woods accorded with the essential elements of 
Statecraft in the modern world.  We argue that the institutionalization of comparative 
advantage by Bretton Woods was only another stage in the evolution of the State.  
Bretton Woods set in motion transformations in the order of states which, in turn, 
contributed to the continued metamorphosis of Statecraft, and made a new trade order of 
states necessary.  
In Part III, we explain how the Bretton Woods order is becoming obsolete 
because of fundamental shifts in Statecraft.  We begin by explaining how the main 
interpretive and institutional issues that faced the Bretton Woods system, and its World 
Trade Organization successor, were a function of Statecraft in the modern world of 
nation-states.  We claim that the nexus between the inner and outer dimensions of the 
State is gradually pushing the trade world to revisit its reliance on comparative advantage 
as the animating norm of the trading system.  We argue that a new Bretton Woods is 
needed and, with it, a new legitimating trade norm for states, one we identify as 
“enablement of global economic opportunity.”  We do not merely recommend a new 
global trade norm.  We complete our argument with a description of a new set of global 
institutions for world trade, institutions that enable us to make sense of current changes as 
we approach an uncertain future.
The upshot of our argument is three-fold:   (i) first, history never ends, and the 
interdependent mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states will, in each generation, 
usher in the need for revising the international commercial order and have a new 
8constitutional moment; (ii) second, theoreticians and planners of trade can predict not 
only the issues that a trade system will generate at any moment in history, but also 
decipher and anticipate the contours of the next generation.  To do this, however, they 
must understand the mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states.  (ii) third, each 
constitutional moment is bound to set in motion transformative mechanisms that 
essentially plant the seeds of the succeeding generation, and the time has come for a new 
constitutional moment of trade.  Our goal is to outline the contours of the new 
constitutional moment that we believe is needed and of the era that it should usher in.
I. The End of History…and Its Continuation
Fukuyama’s end of history begins in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  The 
Second World War ended with the demise of fascism.  The fall of the Wall in 1989 
marked the endgame for communism and, with it, the triumph of democracy.22
According to Robert Cooper, 1989 did not mark the end of history, but rather set the
stage for the emergence of a new form of the State – the “post-modern state.”23
Similarly, Philip Bobbitt rejects Fukuyama’s claim and sees 1989 as a step in the 
evolution of the State.24  He identifies the new form of the State as the “market-state” 
which, he argues, will succeed the nation-state.  These two theorists of the State agree on 
a number of defining characteristics of the new form of State that, in their view, confirm 
the continuing evolution of the State. Further, their theories point to a nexus and an 
22
 For historical details, see FRANCOIS FURET, THE PASSING OF AN ILLUSION (Deborah Furet trans. 2000).
23
 See Cooper, supra note 8, at 26 (identifying “post-modern Europe” with The Treaty of Rome (1957) and 
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe).
24
 See BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 611-639.
9interplay between the inner face of the state (its constitutional order) and its strategic 
foreign policy and military objectives.  We think Bobbitt and Cooper are right about the 
State.25  But the story they tell is incomplete.
The State has both internal and external dimensions.  States express their relations 
with other states in two aspects.  The first is through strategy.  The most obvious example 
of strategy is war.  Strategic decisions are connected to the inner dimension of the State 
through law.  The second external dimension of the State is trade.  Like strategy, trade is 
a matter of the relations between and among states. And as with strategy, the outer 
dimension of trade is internally expressed through law.  Taken together, Statecraft 
consists of strategy and trade, the two outer dimensions of the State.
The modern era of strategy, which ended around 1989, spanned the better part of 
the 20th century, commencing with World War I, continuing through the defeat of fascism 
and ending with the fall of communism.  During that period, the liberal democracies 
organized themselves as modern welfare nation-states.26  A commitment to sovereignty 
drove the internal and external dimensions of the modern state.27  Modern states adhered 
to relatively absolutist notions of sovereignty over internal policy choices and external 
policy and military objectives.28   The notion of sovereignty was intricately linked to the 
nation as a constitutive feature of the State, to welfare as the legitimating drive of the 
State, and to the balance of powers as a key component of the State’s external strategy.  
25
 We note that even Marxists affirm the evolution of the State over claims for its demise.  See ANTONIO 
NEGRI & MICHAEL HARDT, EMPIRE (2001) and MULTITUDE (2004).
26 For ease of reference, we will refer to these as “modern states.”
27 See generally, BOBBITT, supra note 3, at xxv-xxvii.
28 Id.
10
Sovereignty is tied to the idea of the nation.  The essential goal of the State was to 
protect the nation against external threats and to provide for its internal welfare.  Thus, 
modern states would tolerate few intrusions into their domestic affairs.  From a military 
standpoint, the sovereignty principle was enshrined in the U.N. Charter, which prohibits 
states from violating one another’s sovereignty unless acting in self-defense or in defense 
of an allied state that has itself been invaded.29  This principle held fast through the end of 
the 20th century wars with one important exception, that of colonial wars.30
The other corollary of the notion of sovereignty for nation-states was the idea of 
equal rights between states.  At the United Nations, for example, a fiction was 
maintained, (albeit tempered by rules such as the Security Council veto that recognized 
the superior power of World War II’s victors) that each nation had an equal vote. The 
internal model of the State that Fukuyama described, characterized by a commitment to 
the protection of individual rights and the consent of the governed, was replicated 
internationally.  The intended outcome was a society of modern nation-states that would 
have formal equality, and that could not violate each other’s territory. Throughout this 
period of history, sovereignty had been inextricably tied to the concept of a nation.  The 
nation was sovereign, and although it was largely ethnic, it defined itself by its physical 
borders and the population that it had inherited throughout centuries of evolution.  
Having grown and become more powerful, the modern state underwent a metamorphosis 
from state-nation, a state supported by a nation, to nation-state, a state supporting its 
nation.  The primary means of support was the notion of welfare - coupled with a system 
29
 Art. 51, U.N. Charter, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
30
  For discussion of colonial wars, see infra at text accompanying notes 31-35.
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of protection of minority rights or rights deemed fundamental - as its legitimating 
objective.  
Europe and the United States differed in their domestic approach to providing 
welfare to the citizenry.  Europe had a stronger set of social entitlements, such as 
unemployment benefits, large family allowances, strong employee protection, early and 
generous retirement benefits, just to name a few features.  For several reasons, some 
historical and some structural, the United States did not adopt social entitlement packages 
to the extent that Europe had.31  Nevertheless, like Europe, the legitimacy of the 
government of the United States depended in substantial part on its promotion of the 
welfare of large middle and working classes.32
On the international scene, the society of modern nation-states attempted again to 
export its domestic ideas.  The discourse over development, for example, has been 
dominated by the model of the sovereign nation-state and its extension of welfare to other 
sovereign nations.  Africa is a prime example of this phenomenon.  The modern 
sensibility could not tolerate colonialism.  It viewed the African peoples as “foreign 
nations,” whose status as nations entitled them to a state.  Not surprisingly, the idea of 
“the nation” also made its way to the colonized, who often came to age and were 
educated in systems that viewed the nation-state, governed by democratic principles, as 
the ultimate form of human organization.  The result was a push to end colonialism and 
to substitute a government of the nation (at least formally) for that of the colonizers; put 
otherwise, the colonized became unwilling to live under a state controlled by another 
31
 For discussion and possible explanation, see JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLRIDGE, THE RIGHT 
NATION: CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA (2004).
32 COOPER, supra note 8, at 42-43.
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“nation,” and made it difficult for the colonizer to retain such control.33  The upshot 
(which of course did not come to pass) would be a nation state governed by democratic 
principles, which would gradually develop and achieve parity with its Western big 
siblings.
Lastly, the notion of balance of power was linked to the concepts of sovereignty 
and of the nation as the interlocutor of the state in its quest for legitimacy.  In the modern 
system, nation-states with strong sovereign powers maintained international orders by 
balancing each other’s powers.  Balance of powers, rather than the hegemonic 
domination of an empire or superpower, was the preferred method of achieving order.34
The modern world viewed states as equal citizens of world society.  The concept of 
hegemony was antithetical to this worldview, however fictional or detached from reality 
it might have been.  Thus, it was the alternative, an order based on balance among equals 
(or a substantial group of equals), that came to dominate the Western world in the modern 
era.
Today, the modern state is gradually declining in various parts of the world but 
especially so in Europe.  To be sure, the nations of the world continue to adhere to a 
substantial extent to territorial and constitutional Statecraft of the kind that emerged in 
the 20th century.  However, a foundational transformative shift similar to the one that 
brought about the nation-state in the 20th century is taking place.  
The first essential characteristic of the society of post-modern states that is 
relevant to our thesis is that notions of sovereignty and borders are gradually losing the 
33
  See FRANZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1965).
34
 When he wedded balance of powers to the idea of “containment,” George Kennan authored the US 
approach to the Cold War.  See X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 566-582 (1947).
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central role they played in the modern era.35  Increasingly, post- modern states accept, to 
various degrees, control-sharing over domestic matters with supranational or global 
regimes and institutions.36  Next, states are experiencing a loss of domestic control 
because, as we will describe further later, traditional tools for regulating industry, such as 
monetary policy, have been rendered less effective by increasingly diffuse, cross-border 
forces, and because of the rise of environmental, health and security threats that are also 
too diffuse to be controlled by domestic policy only.37  Further, the once-rigid 
international rules on the use of force have given way to a nascent principle of customary 
international law that permits foreign intervention in the affairs of a state that engages in 
egregious violations of human rights (e.g., Serbia, Rwanda) or threaten sensitive areas of 
international finance or commerce.38  All in all, sovereignty, while still a foundational 
basis of international relations, is gradually eroding.
Welfare has also begun to fade as the legitimating basis for the State.39  The 
decline of welfare is taking two discrete forms:  the strong pressure in Continental Europe 
on the cradle to grave systems established in the 20th century40 and, perhaps more 
significantly, the failure of the welfare state to take root in the South.  Europe is 
35
 See ROBERT COOPER, supra note 8, at 66-67.
36 Id. at 27 (“The legitimate monopoly on force that is the essence of statehood is thus subject to 
international – but self-imposed – constraints.”).
37
 Id. at 102.
38
 Id. at 59. 
39 See BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 240-242.
40
 The situation is most acute in Germany.  See Mark Landler, German Joblessness Rises As Benefits Are 
Reduced, Late Edition - Final , Section C , Page 5 , Column 1, 2/3/2005.  The complexities of the German 
context are discussed in PETER BLESES & MARTIN SEELEIB-KAIER, THE DUAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
GERMAN WELFARE STATE (2004).  See also GABOR STEINGART, DEUTSCHLAND: DER ABSTIEG EINES 
SUPERPOWER (2004) (the story of Germany’s decline since 1945).
14
witnessing a dual internal phenomenon when it comes to welfare.  In part, the welfare 
system is viewed as an inalienable set of social rights, a core component of the acquis 
social set of progressive measures that should never be reversed.  Britain, for example, is 
increasing its public spending on welfare.41  In France, any governmental attempt to 
decrease the level of benefits in a meaningful manner is sure to be met with unrest and 
protest of the kind that paralyzed the country at various times in recent years.  At the 
same time, the State by all accounts is rapidly losing its ability to sustain the welfare 
programs.  The aging of the European population endangers retirement schemes.  The 
economic burdens placed on employers are deterring employment, social mobility, and 
fluid growth, and they consistently fall short of generating the income necessary to shore 
up the system, which is constantly running at a deficit.
The South provides an even bleaker illustration of the waning of welfare.  The 
adoption by decolonized nations of the boundaries inherited from colonial powers was, 
by and large, not followed by the adoption of welfare systems that replicate the West’s.  
The reasons are manifold.  In many countries, particular ethnic or other discrete groups 
vied for power and control of resources to be redistributed among themselves, not to the 
“nation.”  The nation, for that matter, did not really exist.  It was created by the colonial 
powers and used as a catalyst and focal point for achieving independence. When 
domestic politics started to take their course, the groupings began to focus more on 
ethnic, tribal, and other more natural identification markers, and less on the concept of 
the nation as defined in colonial times.  Furthermore, on a fundamental economic level, 
41 2004 HM SPENDING REVIEW, PN A2,12 July 2004,http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_sr04/press/spend_sr04_press13.cfm; see also Rachel Smithes, 
Public and Private Welfare Activity in the United Kingdom, 1979-1999, available at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper93.pdf
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the developing countries did not follow the industrialization and “state-nation” 
strengthening pattern that characterized the West.  They inherited a State, which was 
viewed from the West with lenses developed through centuries of a unique history, but 
which in reality had as little likelihood of pursuing its citizens’ welfare than, say, the 
French Kingdoms that preceded the Revolution. 
The difficulty of achieving welfare will arguably lead governments to shift their 
focus towards the maximization of economic opportunity.  Such policies could take many 
forms.  In Japan, for example, the government may focus on subsidizing research and 
development to give domestic industries the best possible edge.42 Elsewhere, the 
emphasis may be on providing education and infrastructure, all the while deregulating 
markets.43 In yet other societies, the emphasis may be on creating commercial structures 
that give workers ownership stakes, so as to maximize their opportunity for economic 
advancement.44 In all events, the bottom line is that instead of focusing on ensuring the 
welfare of everyone, the State will gradually shift its foundational approach towards 
maximizing the economic opportunity available to all.  While welfare policies of course 
continue to obtain in Europe and throughout the world, the tide of history seems to shift 
away from welfare as the core element of Statecraft that was axiomatic in the modern 
world.
In sum, the developments described above have resulted in a trend towards the 
modern state’s loss of its ability to control the domestic arena and to enact policies that 
42 BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 284.
43
 Id. at 670-71.
44 Id. at 673.
16
would protect the welfare of the nation.45  To be sure, the world is not completely post-
modern.  As Cooper notes,46 post-modern states live alongside modern and even pre-
modern states.47  In addition, there are various pre-modern states on the international 
scene, where the official organs of the State do not even enjoy exclusive use of force 
within their own borders. Nevertheless, we believe that the trend that we are describing 
provides an accurate account of a transformational move in Statecraft and international 
relations.
45
 For an insightful analysis of the complex relation between states and transnational firms and control of 
the domestic arena, see Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE 
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91-110 (Rodney B. Hall and Thomas J. Bierstecker eds. 2002).
46 See COOPER, supra note 8, at 16-26.
47 Certain important players on the international scene, such as Indonesia and India, may still qualify as 
modern states.  These states, while operating in an increasingly post-modern world, continue to adhere to 
notions of sovereignty and nation, and they are not characterized by the same degree of diffuseness that is 
increasingly apparent in post-modern states. Cf., e.g., Gurcharan Das, Is India Shining? WALL ST. J. EUR., 
May 4, 2004, at A8 (discussing India’s drive to achieve ‘nation-building’ through economic success).
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II:  Jacob’s Ladder:  Statecraft, Trade and the Order of States: A Theory of 
Interwoven Mechanics
The foundational notions of the international trading system reflect not so much 
the outcome of a material dialectic among states (e.g., the historical recognition of the 
damage that arose from the failure to follow a comparative advantage model) but rather 
they arise from the interwoven architecture of State and of the international trade order of 
states, and from the dynamic evolution of both planes that stem from parallel yet related 
metamorphoses.  Transformations in domestic statecraft drive the evolution of the 
international trade order and, in turn, transformative shifts on the international 
commercial plane tend to change the domestic configuration of the State.  
This relationship of interdependence and connectedness is dynamic and manifests 
itself on a foundational level.  The domestic constitutional architecture of the State,48
such as its organization around a nation and its self-legitimization through the promotion 
of that nation’s welfare,49 have profound repercussions on the ordering of the 
international trade system.50 At the same time, shifts in the foundational rules of the 
48
  We will explain below the meaning of constitutional choices, as used in this context.
49
 We use the concept of welfare to capture broadly the policies of the nation-state that foster a broad level 
of acceptance of the modern liberal democracies by the different elements of the constituent nations.  
Western Europe, Asia and the United States were the more powerful elements of the players on the 
international order.  In addition to its security and strategic functions, the State as lived by all these players 
redistributed wealth, provided a safety net for the nation, and protected economic and other rights for broad 
segments of the population.  The policy choices and the law that sprung from this fundamental element of 
Statecraft spanned a substantial part of the inner order of the states (including labor laws, unemployment 
benefits, retirement rules, aid to families, taxation law, subsidies, public investment and other central 
components of the domestic legal and regulatory order).  As discussed below, nation-states such as France, 
the United States or Japan took different approaches to achieving welfare, but their inner orders shared the 
essential hallmarks of legitimacy of the nation-state in relation to the nation.
50
 The association of welfare with the nation-state deepened as the 20th century, Cooper’s modern era.  See
Michael Hart, Coercion or Cooperation: Social Policy and Future Trade Negotiations, 20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 
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international trade system and in patterns of international economic activity, such as the 
rise of a new set of international economic actors or transformations in currency markets, 
affect the ability of the State to maintain its domestic statecraft and tend to transform the 
inner order of the State.51  Like Jacob’s ladder, the State and the order of states are 
animated by a constant interaction going from bottom to top, and vice versa, in a dynamic 
motion that shape both spheres and, in turn, propel them forward through various stages 
of history.  Just as Fukuyama and Hegel were lured into thinking that strategic and 
political history ended, trade theorists might misinterpret a historical transformation of 
sufficient significance as sounding the end of trade history.  In truth, however, the story is 
always bound to continue.
As detailed below, the dynamic relationship of interdependence and 
connectedness between State and the order of states may be observed at a descriptive 
level. In addition, as a normative matter, states must acknowledge overarching structural 
changes within their domestic sphere as well as on the international plane, and quickly 
identify how these shifts affect their interaction with the rest of the international 
economic community.  Trade policy must then be adjusted to accord with internal 
political and ideological goals and with the evolving international scene. To be sure, 
351, 377  (“Over the course of the twentieth century, the attributes of the nation-state grew further to 
embrace the social welfare state. By the middle of the century, attributes of the nation-state included not 
only territorial and national integrity, but also the capacity to promote the economic and social well-being 
of its citizens. At the same time, the post-war system of multilateral rules and organizations became the 
latest expression of rules to govern inter-state relations. As with the expansion in the attributes of the 
nation-state, the range of issues addressed by the rules of inter-state relations had similarly expanded.”)
51 Id.  (“Today we face a new reality. Advances in transportation and communications technology have 
made it possible to breach the territorial, social and cultural integrity of the nation-state on a daily basis. 
The convergence of popular cultures and the crisis of the welfare state all point to the need to develop a 
new definition of sovereignty as well as a new set of norms and rules for inter-state relations. In short, we 
need a new set of rules that recognizes that the realm of goods, services, capital and technology has largely 
escaped from the effective regulation of the territorial nation-state, while its people remain largely attached 
to it.”)
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structural shifts do not happen overnight.  However, there comes a point in time when a 
constitutional moment is needed.  States must come together then and recognize that 
Statecraft and the order of states has undergone a metamorphosis of sufficient maturity 
and magnitude to warrant a new set of constitutional rules.52
The constitutional moment is a rite of passage, in that it marks an international 
awareness that change has happened, and a crucial exercise in recognizing the nature of 
the change and in instilling throughout the system fundamental new norms that will take 
their course throughout the new era.  The states’ failure to recognize the constitutional 
moment will not only prejudice them economically, but also possibly hamper the 
achievement of their non-trade strategic foreign policy objectives.  Ending history, then, 
is not only an academic and intellectual mistake; rather, it is as dangerous an illusion as 
believing that invaders may be repelled in World War II with a Maginot Line born out of 
World War I, in that the human difficulty in stepping out of deeply rooted paradigms to 
look at the future is bound to generate defeat in the present.
We have selected the 20th century as a historical prism from which to illustrate 
our theory, focusing on the GATT/WTO, but also making incursions into the European 
Union and regional arrangements such as the NAFTA to illustrate our point on a 
comparative basis.  
A.  Failure and Redemption.
52 We argue in Part III that such a constitutional moment has become necessary in the early part of the 20th
century.  As illustrated in various contexts below, we use the notion of constitutional moment as a 
conscious choice based on the interaction of Statecraft as inner law.  It relates less to a change in the 
ordering of society that legitimizes the adoption of certain constitutional norms, than to the infusion of new 
norms to recognizing the interaction between inner state order and the international order of states.  Cf. 
Bruce Ackerman, Fidelity as Synthesis, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1519 (1997)(Ackerman defines a 
constitutional moment as a moment that "occurs when a rising political movement succeeds in placing a 
new problematic at the center of American political life). 
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The 20th century trade story, as classically told, is one of failure and redemption.  
In this instance, beginning the inquiry with an exploration of redemption, and telling the 
story with the voice of an economist, makes the contours of failure clearer.  Redemption 
happens after World War II, with the incorporation into the GATT of the theories of 
absolute and comparative advantage developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo.53
Both economists posited that states would maximize their wealth by unilaterally 
eliminating import restrictions.54  However, they did not address the use of law to erect 
an international system that would institutionalize their economic insights.55  The GATT 
did that.  At its core, the GATT established three “disciplines” that removed states’ 
ability to discriminate against one another in an effort to protect the domestic economy:  
tariff bindings, a non-discrimination norm applicable to internal taxation and regulation, 
and a prohibition of quotas and like measures.56
The first anti-protectionism discipline created a framework for the GATT 
Contracting Parties to bind the tariffs that they imposed on foreign products, the primary 
protectionist barrier of the first half of the 20th Century.57  The GATT did not require its 
constituent states actually to reduce tariffs.  Rather, the regulatory framework called for 
53 See KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, GATT-THINK (Nat’ Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 8005 (2000).
54 See, e.g., JACQUES MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001).
55
   Robert Howse, Symposium:  The Boundaries of the WTO:  From Politics to Technocracy – and Back 
Again:  The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 A.J.I.L. 94 (2002).
56
   This removal of barriers to trade spurned a sharp increase in cross border economic activities among 
nation-states over the second half of the twentieth century.  The GATT took off with [23] Contracting 
Parties, gradually took hold in over [150] nations.  It progressively reached to new subject matter areas, 
such as intellectual property and trade in services.  These developments are what grants to Bretton Woods, 
in retrospect, its status as a constitutional moment.
57
   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT].
21
multilateral negotiations of ceilings (the “bindings”) that, once agreed upon, would 
establish the maximum duty that the concerned state may legally apply for the relevant 
product category.58  In turn, each state committed, under the Most Favored Nation Clause 
of the GATT, to extend to all trading partners the lowest tariff concession chosen by the 
state with respect to any partner.  This framework created an institutional framework for 
the gradual reduction by the Contracting Parties of global tariffs.  This structure 
generated eight rounds of trade negotiations, and a drastic reduction of the global tariff 
barriers to trade that prevailed before Bretton Woods.59
The second discipline required the Contracting Parties to respect a non-
discrimination norm that guarantees all imported products the same treatment as “like” 
domestic products with respect to internal taxation and regulation.60  At its core, the 
“national treatment” discipline prevents the circumvention of a tariff binding by the 
imposition of a discriminatory burden in the form of, by way of example, internal sales 
tax. 61
The concept of discrimination is of course laden with ambiguity and has 
generated substantial controversy, in no small part because it has brought to the 
58
  The tariff bindings system was supplemented by the Most Favored Nation clause of the GATT.  The 
tariff bindings, as explained in the text, established a maximum allowable tariff.  Correlatively, it left each 
Contracting Party free to lower their tariffs with respect to any trading partner.  Under the MFN principle, 
however, each Contracting Party had to extend to all other GATT members the lowest tariff rate applied by 
the Contracting Party in any product category.  GATT art. II.
59
   The GATT sought to “tariffy” barriers to trade so as to establish a transparent framework for tariff 
reduction negotiations in successive “rounds.”  Over the course of the eight rounds that were completed 
since the GATT came into effect among its original 23 signatories, the average tariff among Contracting 
Parties has gone down from above 40% to less than 4%.  See www.wto.org. 
60
   GATT art. III.
61 See, e.g., Report of Panel, Japan Customs-Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and 
Alcoholic Products (Nov. 10, 1987).
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international plane challenges to national policies ostensibly unrelated to trade that 
disparately impacts foreign products.62  However, putting aside interpretive difficulties, 
the national treatment component of the GATT is an indispensable element of any treaty 
of integration that includes a tariff reduction scheme.  Without a national treatment 
discipline, a member state of such a treaty could impose discriminatory taxation or 
regulation on foreign products so as to avoid its tariff obligations.63  In the panoply of 
international measures to eliminate protectionism, national treatment is an indispensable 
tool.
The third discipline prohibits the imposition of quantitative restrictions to trade 
and their functional equivalents.64  The purpose of this discipline, and the interpretive 
questions that it has generated, parallel the national treatment story.  Here, too, the 
founders of the GATT evidently sought to deprive states of a weapon of circumvention of 
the tariff discipline.  If State A cannot protect a sector of the economy by imposing a 
62 See, e.g., Report of Panel, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT DS-8-R (July 11, 1996).   In this 
case, the WTO rejected the argument of the United States to the effect that an aim and effect test should be 
applied to root out protectionism when determining whether the national treatment provisions of the GATT 
were violated.  The literature and commentary on national treatment are of course voluminous and they lie 
squarely beyond the scope of this Article.  Suffice it to say that, even with an explicit mandate to root out 
protectionism and to shelter national laws that furthers legitimate government purposes, national laws that 
involved both protectionist and legitimate purposes might be challenged.  In Reformulated Gasoline, for 
example, the WTO was asked to evaluate the legality of a United States regulation, promulgated pursuant 
to the Clean Air Act, which imposed more onerous requirements on foreign companies ostensibly on the 
grounds that compliance with the substantive norm of the statute was difficult.  While a protectionist 
purpose might be inferred from the record, it is also evident that the United States’ interest in protecting its 
environment were at stake.   See Report of the Appellate Body, United States -- Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 26, 1996)
63
   Imagine, to illustrate this point, that State A agrees not to impose a tariff on State B’s cars in excess of 
5%.  If State A enacted a discriminatory sales tax, which burdens State B’s cars by say 10%, it would have 
achieved a functionally equivalent economic result as a 10% tariff would accomplish.  The difficult 
questions of interpretation arise when, for example, the internal sales tax applies to cars that consume more 
than a specified level of gasoline per mile, and State A’s sales tax disproportionately burden State B’s cars 
because they tend to belong the category of products that is affected by the (ostensibly neutral) definition.
64
   GATT art. XI.
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tariff,65 it should not have the opportunity to do so by applying a quota to the imported 
products:66  The interpretative problems associated with this GATT discipline relate of 
course to what is a quota67 and also to the validity under international law of justifications 
asserted by a state to defend what otherwise would amount to an illegal quantitative 
restriction.68
The GATT, then, institutionalized on a multi-lateral level the classical economic 
theories of Ricardo and Smith.  The orthodox economic account of the GATT speaks of 
redemption because it contrasts the GATT with the economic failures that preceded 
World War II.  While the story has nuances, its motif is that the main trading partners 
failed to recognize that commerce should be based on comparative advantage and that 
states should remove artificial barriers to trade.  In characteristic fashion, the economists 
wrote another chapter in the Book of Mistakes from the Inter-War Period.  Not only did 
Versailles oppress Germany instead of bringing it into Europe’s fold as a partner, but the 
liberal democracies stubbornly insisted on rejecting a timeless notion of economic 
organization.  It was not enough for the democracies to fail strategically and allow 
fascism to take over Germany; they also had to deprive themselves of economic unity and 
65
 By way of example, if a 1000% tariff on foreign luxury cars would result in a drop in import from 
1,000,000 cars to 1000 cars, a regulating state may achieve the same economic outcome by imposing a 
1000 cars annual quota.  
66 See, e.g.¸ GATT Dispute Panel Report on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, GATT B.I.S.D. 
(31st Supp.) t 94 (May 15, 1984), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm.
67 See, e.g., Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 
DS 10/R-37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990).
68 See, e.g., Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)[hereinafter Shrimp I].
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strength by giving in to protectionist impulses at the very time when they needed to join 
forces in the fight against fascism.69
Bretton Woods is the constitutional moment of this story in that it reflects the 
understanding of the historical mistake made by the liberal democracies.  Here as well, 
the discourse often assumes an end of history.  While the international legal order grew, it 
remained essentially committed to its original mission.70  The Book of Mistakes had to be 
rewritten into the Book of Redemption.  Economic collapse caused by trade wars would 
not only be unthinkable, but made impossible by a trading system that adopted 
comparative advantage as its foundational value.71
To be sure, the end of economic history has its nuances and does not entirely stop 
with the system put into place with GATT.  The GATT does not merely establish three 
disciplines intended to combat economic protectionism.  Over time, the trade system 
established intellectual property norms that protect the intangible assets of the enterprises 
of Contracting Parties throughout the trading world.72  Rules on procurement, dumping, 
69 See, e.g., Paul R. Krugman, A Loss of (Theoretical) Nerve:  The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free 
Trade, 83 Am.U.L.Rev. 62 (1993).  See also JACQUES MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION (2001). See Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare, in 
Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P. 
Kindleberger 69 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al. eds., 1971); Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al., Domestic Distortions, 
Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1963); Harry G. Johnson, Optimal Trade
Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions, in Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments: 
Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler (Richard E. Caves et al. eds., 1965); Peter J. Lloyd, A More General 
Theory of Price Distortions in Open Economies, 4 J. Int'l Econ. 365 (1974).
70
  The parallel with the strategic story of the post-War period is striking.  In his grand declaration of 1950, 
Robert Schuman captured the strategic sentiment that spurred the unification of Europe when famously 
declared that “a united Europe was not achieved and we had war.” Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950.
71
  See The Bretton Woods Project, Background to the Issues (stating that forty-three countries that met at 
Bretton Woods conceived of the World Bank and IMF during World War II to help rebuild Europe in post-
war reconstruction efforts), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/background/index.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
72 TRIPs established minimum levels of protection regarding patents, copyright and trademarks that  the 
Contracting Parties must transpose into domestic law.  The rationale for TRIPs is that opening up barriers 
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subsidies, technical barriers to trade, and sanitary measures were adopted.73  The WTO 
established a system of judicial remedies which, albeit State to State, produces decisions 
and reasoned opinions that are reminiscent of the domestic systems of justice in liberal 
democracies.74  The Doha Round of negotiations could well take an historical step in 
eliminating subsidies and other protective measure related to agricultural products, 
thereby denting systems of protection of farmers that have deep historical and political 
roots in Europe and other industrialized areas.75
to trade would give undertakings in countries with lesser intellectual property protection access to products 
protected in other jurisdictions.  Without intellectual property protection in the importing jurisdiction, these 
undertakings could lawfully infringe on rights that are protected in the foreign jurisdiction.  Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]; Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 144-47 (2d ed. 2003).
73
  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1140 
(1994) [hereinafter SPM Agreement]; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1140 
(1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter Antidumping (AD) 
Agreement]; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement].
74
 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm.  See also Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, 
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. 
L. REV. 1.
75
 The Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration of 2001 provides in pertinent parts:
“1. The multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organization has contributed 
significantly to economic growth, development and employment throughout the past fifty years. We are 
determined, particularly in the light of the global economic slowdown, to maintain the process of reform 
and liberalization of trade policies, thus ensuring that the system plays its full part in promoting recovery, 
growth and development. 
…
2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development and the alleviation 
of poverty. We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and 
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO members are developing 
countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this 
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However, these were all new chapters within the end of history paradigm.  Doha 
may bring in more access for developing countries’ produce.76  The WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body, even if it evolved into a system of access for individuals over the next 
generations, seeks at its core to eliminate the Contracting Parties’ ability to selectively 
exit their substantive obligations.77   Its jurisprudence in such seminal cases as 
Shrimp/Turtle or Reformulated Gasoline address the conflict between trade liberalization 
and countervailing domestic policies.78  Intellectual property or technical barriers to trade 
rules begin the process of harmonization that, as the European experience illustrates, goes 
hand in hand with market access.79  Anti-dumping regulates such market access by 
Declaration. Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to make positive 
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure 
a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. In this 
context, enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical 
assistance and capacity-building programmes have important roles to play.
76 See, e.g., Eugenia McGill, Poverty and Social Analysis of Trade Agreements: A More Coherent 
Approach?, 27 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 371 (2004).
77
  The concept of selective exit was articulated by Professor Weiler in his seminal article, The 
Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991).  While the concept is multifaceted, and Professor 
Weiler uses it in conjunction with an analysis of States’ participation in supranational lawmaking, it 
captures at its core the ability of states to escape their international obligations selectively, all the while 
avoiding enforcement by other countries because of enforcement deficiencies.  One of the starkest 
examples involves international laws that can only be litigated at the International Court of Justice level, 
where states cannot be forced to appear unless they consent to jurisdiction. See Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 36(1)-(3), 59 Stat 1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute], U.N. 
CHARTER, art. 36. The old GATT panel system, which allowed the losing party to veto the decision, also 
illustrates the workings of selective exit under international law. The overhauled WTO is of course a State-
to-State system, and dispute resolution frameworks of that type face the customary difficulties inherent in 
States’ logistical limitations and reluctance to sue other states when they themselves are likely to be in 
violation of the given treaty.  The new system, however, removes countries’ ability to escape their 
obligations in that decisions are binding, and failure to respect them may result in sanctions. See, e.g., 
BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHAEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: 
FROM GATT TO WTO (1995).  
78 See, e.g., Andrew L. Strauss, From Guttzilla to the Green Giant:  Winning the Environmental Battle for 
the Soul of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 769 (1998).
79
  The TRIPS Agreement, for example, establishes a minimal level of intellectual property protection that 
the GATT Contracting Parties must provide under domestic law.
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precluding trade practices that are deemed unfair and anti-competitive.80  When Bretton 
Woods ushered in a trade liberalization framework, it set in motion a historical course 
that was bound to generate the issues that these international regulatory frameworks 
address, and that future rules will continue to address.  However, as we describe below, 
while Bretton Woods surely has retained enormous relevance, the transformative shifts 
that it has generated require a new constitutional moment.
Before we reach the new constitutional moment, however, we must continue to 
tell the story of Bretton Woods.  The economist has now finished its discourse, and in 
come the lawyer and the theoretician of the State.  As Keynes wrote, the lawyers were the 
“poets of Bretton Woods.”  In order to understand our theory, we must now explain the 
contours of their poetry.81
B. Bretton Woods and the State.
All serious students of trade have learned that the economic ideology of trade 
provides only a partial, and perhaps even junior, account of the original intent of the 
framers of the GATT and the reasons for its general acceptance by the Contracting 
Parties.  In order to understand the GATT, one has to look at internal foundational 
frameworks of the major players that brought about its formation after World War II.82
These constitutional rules83 help explain why the major economic powers that formed the 
80
   See Anti-Dumping Code, (Agreement on Implementation of the GATT Article IV), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#fAgreement.
81 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the 
Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 50 (Robert Howse ed., 1988), reprinted in JOHN 
GERARD RUGGIE, MULTILATERALISM MATTERS 125 (1993).
82 See Howse, supra note 81, at 96-98.
83
  We will define the meaning of “constitutional rules” below.
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GATT chose the legal structure that it embodied, and why they mustered the political 
willingness to accept the trade disciplines that the treaty imposed on them.  This account 
complements the economic story.  It essentially holds that the internal configuration of 
the states that formed the GATT had to work in harmony with the international system 
that they put in place.  States did not simply have an economic epiphany.  They chose 
GATT because they could maintain their domestic architecture, all the while entering into 
an international framework that allowed them to expand the global economic pie.
While this account goes deeper than the economic tale, again it has an end of 
history flavor.  The story assumes that the State reached its apex when it organized itself 
along modern liberal democratic lines and established an internal constitutional 
framework for redistributing resources.  It starts with the constitutional rules that were 
fundamental to modern liberal democracies after World War II.  These included broad 
legal and policy schemes that embodied a given state’s wealth choices as to redistributive 
justice and the relationship between various economic segments of society.  Indeed, the 
internal system of all major GATT players rested on the redistribution of wealth and 
control of the domestic economy through interventionist, welfare policies.  This is best 
explained in broad strokes.  In Europe, these policies would take the shape of public 
enterprise, unemployment compensation, housing aid, help to large families, and other 
policies intended to transfer wealth from high income segments of society to lower 
income workers and to protect discrete classes deemed to be disadvantaged in the market.  
In the United States, the emphasis was more exclusively on tax and transfer policies.  
Japan, for its part, relied heavily on centralized planning of industrial activity and 
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subsidies of research and development that would shore up enterprises that housed a large 
part of the domestic workforce.84
Despite their different viewpoints regarding, all major players shared a basic 
philosophy of domestic statecraft that went hand-in-hand with liberalized trade.85
Liberalized trade worked not only because comparative advantage was the right 
foundational principle for international commerce. Rather, Bretton Woods also allowed 
the Contracting Parties to marry international economic policies and an international 
order of states that tended to maximize wealth creation with a legal framework that 
protected their ability to control the domestic economy.  The negative covenants of the 
GATT, as originally structured, left the Contracting Parties free to utilize interventionist 
domestic policies.  It is of course true that trade liberalization conflicted with domestic 
policies in many instances, and that many battles have been waged on this front.  The 
system, though, was designed for the State to have the means to repel trade 
liberalization.86
Simplistically put, it allowed for a maximization of the global output and 
economic pie available for redistribution to each nation-state.  The tariffs, national 
treatment and quotas rule did not, as originally framed and implemented, supplant 
domestic rules on redistributive justice.  France, for example, could extend housing aid to 
84 DOUGLAS A.IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 
(1996); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONALTRADE, ch. 1 (2d ed. 1999); JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, MULTILATERALISM 
MATTERS (1993).
85 See JOHN G. RUGGIE, Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes, in 
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLICY:  ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1998); Howse, supra note ***; Jeffrey Dunoff; The Death of the Trade 
Regime, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 733 (1999).  
86 Id.
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disadvantaged workers, provide for workforce-protective labor rules, maintain a 
nationalized health system, keep a government stake in major enterprises, or pay grants 
upon the birth of a third child, without any interference from the international trade 
rules.87  Japan’s Ministry of Trade and Industry could continue its indicative planning, 
and the United States could freely tax and spend, without running afoul or being hindered 
by the international system.88  While the international system contained domestic 
protectionist urges of the type that produced the “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that 
preceded World War II, it married itself well with the economic ethos of the modern 
liberal democracies.89
The harmonious functioning of domestic constitutional rules and international law 
came hand in hand with historical tendencies that made comparative advantage a better 
foundational norm for the international trading system than the domestically driven, 
mercantilist policies that preceded World War II.  These policies, embodied in statutes 
such as the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,90 were clearly thought by the GATT 
founders to have contributed to the economic disasters of the 1930s and to the advent of 
87 See Lionel Jospin, Equilibriste, Economist, July 26, 1997, at 41; Roger Cohen, France v. U.S.: Warring 
Versions of Capitalism, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1997, at A10; European Commission, Social Protection in the 
Member States 13-23 (1997) (summarizing social protection trend and Member States' reforms).
88
  See Asian Economies: More Myth than Miracle?, The Washington Post, November 25, 1997, at 1; see 
also RETHINKING THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE (Joseph E. Stiglitz & Shahid Yusuf eds., 2000).
89 The “good governance” justification for the GATT framework, which in substance holds that 
international trade increases domestic welfare by containing narrow protectionist interests that may have 
disproportionate political clout, is a familiar element of the standard “GATT rationale list.”  Brett Williams, 
The Influence and Lack of Influence of Principles in the Negotiation for China’s Access to the World Trade 
Organization, 33 Geo.Wash Int’l L. Rev. 791 (2001).  Cite to WTO web site too.
90
  See generally Great Depression, at http://www.education.yahoo.com/search
/be?1b[fct<]extended,38,0>pl1%3AG/great depression (last visited Aug. 21, 2002;  Hawley-Smoot Tariff 
Act, Col. Encyclopedia (6th Ed. 2001), available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/ha/HawleySm.html (last 
visited April 5, 2005) (stating that "the act brought retaliatory tariffs from foreign countries, U.S. foreign 
trade suffered a sharp decline, and the depression intensified").
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fascism as a contender for control of statecraft.91   By binding the liberal democracies to a 
set of rules that would not only make such disasters legally impossible but would also not 
threaten their perception of economic sovereignty, the GATT created a world trade 
system that accorded with internal law and politics.92
Economic prose and legal poetry, then, created a system that many observers 
analyze with static, end of history lenses.  Much ink has been shed on how to improve it, 
but most of the critiques operate within the confines of the Bretton Woods constitutional 
moment in that they accept the State as understood at Bretton Woods as the domestic 
participant in the order of states.  Consider the prime topics of contention in today’s trade 
world:  The battle waged at the border of trade liberalization and conflicting domestic 
policies assumes a sovereign State to which the order of states leaves the prerogative to 
regulate its territory and to redistribute resources.  Whether or not the United States can 
legally exclude shrimp caught at the expense of sea turtles or France can legally ban the 
import of asbestos, the stakes relate to the precise location of the border between 
domestic and international forces.93  The developing countries’ plight, which pervades 
91 See Howse, supra note 81.  See also DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF 
FREE TRADE (1996).
92
  As Professor Weiler pointed out, the economic ethos of the GATT was largely a result of the creation by 
the professional trade elite that the GATT created of norms intended to project the impression that the 
organization was grounded in “economic science” and insulated from crass politics.  “A dominant feature 
of the GATT was its self-referential and even communitarian ethos explicable in constructivist terms.  The 
GATT successfully managed a relative insulation from the `outside’ world of international relations and 
established among its practitioners a closely knit environment revolving round a certain of shared 
normative values (of free trade) and shared institutional (and personal) ambitions situated in a matrix of 
long-term first-name networks.”  Joseph H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats:  
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of Dispute Settlement, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
AND LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENIUM 334, 336-
337 (Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve, Arvind Subramanian, and Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds. 2001).
93
  See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GATT:  Environmental Trade Measures and the Shrimp-
Turtle Case, 74 S.CAL.L.REV. 31 (2000).
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the Doha Round, is couched principally in terms of market access and the end of 
hypocrisy.94  If Doha had a slogan, it would be that its participants should let Bretton 
Woods ring throughout the world.  At the end of the day, the trading world is still 
engaged in the concretization of a constitutional moment that, as we describe later, has 
not run its course yet, but is in need of a fresh look in light of the transformative shifts 
that it has brought about.
C.  The State and the Order of States.
Our theory posits that the relationship between the domestic constitutional realm  
and the international trade order of states goes well beyond the marriage of a good 
economic idea with a legal system that makes its acceptance politically palatable. We 
depart from the notion that Bretton Woods, joining comparative advantage with a theory 
of the State as having reached its highest expression in the form of the modern liberal 
democracy, ended the trade history.  Rather, we submit that Bretton Woods ushered in a 
constitutional moment that acknowledged both the then current evolutionary stage of the 
State and the new order of states that Statecraft metamorphosis had generated.  
Our starting point coincides with the analysis of Bretton Woods as a joint political 
and economic enterprise in that we agree that the Keynesian welfare state was 
particularly well suited for the GATT framework and its introduction of comparative 
advantage and anti-protectionist rules.  Keynes was right to call the lawyers, and the 
political theory that they wrote into the Treaty, the “poets of Bretton Woods.”95  The 
GATT, as explained above, sheltered welfare policies and left constituent states free to 
94 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
95 See Howse, supra note 55; Slaughter, supra note 81.
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act as experimental laboratories on how best to improve their people’s welfare.  In 
addition, it created sufficient ambiguity in the system to permit States to “exit 
selectively” the tenets of free trade based on domestic welfare requirements.96  All in all, 
it is true that the GATT established a framework that insulated domestic politics and 
redistributive justice choices from international intervention, and to that extent it 
accorded with the ethos of the welfare state.  
However, in our account, Bretton Woods came, and (as explained below) it came 
too late, to crystallize in a constitutional moment transformations that had previously 
taken place and to take one more constitutional snapshot in the story of human 
organizational evolution.  Recognizing it as such mandates inquiry into what the next 
constitutional stage should be, and when the rite of passage that will be necessary to set it 
in motion should be held.  That is our task in Part III.  For the moment, let us explain 
Bretton Woods that was (and the Bretton Woods that should have come earlier) through 
our lens. 
As discussed in Part I, the State may be understood as a constant entity that 
undergoes successive constitutional cycles.  During each cycle, the State follows 
relatively stable constitutional features, on both domestic and international planes. At the 
same time, often as a result of the operation of these constitutional features, new realities 
arise to confront states and force them to adjust their fundamental constitutional elements 
and gradually usher in yet another cycle.  Again, the end of history observation, whether 
made by Hegel or Fukuyama, does not sound in a messianic era of Kantian “perpetual 
96 See GATT, art. VI; Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter Safeguards 
Agreement].
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peace”97 nor an end to the evolution of Statecraft.  Those voices, however, keenly reflect 
a sentiment of transformation, widely felt, that should prompt an inquiry as to whether a 
new constitutional cycle may be at hand. 
The State that Bretton Woods faced arose from a period of solidification of the 
“nation” as its basis.  At least in Europe, the respective nations who stood behind the 20th
century states had been formed by coming together under a State that strived to amass 
resources and chose to fight wars in furtherance of their own solidification goals.98  On 
the international scene, the complex colonizing enterprise had strong commercial 
motivations and by all accounts generated substantial economic benefits to the 
colonizers.99 This influenced the respective political and economic powers of the nation-
states that dominated the international scenes, in particular the European states.  At the 
same time, domestically, the process of building the nation generated a population 
comprised of various segments, including large working classes, a bourgeoisie and upper 
classes or nobility, who were collectively affiliated with a single state.100  They came to 
form a nation with which the State now had to contend.  
The focal point of our inquiry is not the organizational nature of the State as a 
modern liberal democracy, but rather the solidification process that it experienced, the 
attendant birth of a nation as its support, and the evolution in Statecraft that arose out of 
97
   Immanuel Kant, PERPETUAL PEACE 21 (N.Y. Liberal Arts Press 1948 trans.); see also KAGAN, supra
note 8; INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 251 (1971).
98 BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 144-204, 468-77.
99 See, generally, Ruth E. Gordon and Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development,  22 Wis. Int'l L.J. 1 
(2004).
100
 See generally Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (1991).
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those phenomena.  It is against this Statecraft background that the competing theories of 
Marxism, fascism and modern liberal democracy would oppose one another for control of 
the State.   All models spoke to the nation, the new “sovereign,” that had come to form 
the basis of the State.  Under the scenarios envisaged by all models, whether a triumph of 
the workers, an eternal Reich, or a Fukuyama ending,  Statecraft history would in fact run 
out its course and end with a particular form of organization in relation to the nation.101
In the Marxist vision, the workers would achieve perpetual control of the State through a 
final class warfare.  The fascist regime would conquer and rule forever.  Modern liberal 
democracies would establish regimes that, in various shapes and forms, featured several 
of the fundamental hallmarks of democracy identified by Fukuyama and many others.  In 
all cases, the nation was the basis of the State, and the welfare of the nation its 
legitimating drive, a common objective to be achieved though different routes.  Without 
this evolution of Statecraft, the competing ideologies would not have had any territory to 
conquer.102
The significance of the nature of Statecraft for Bretton Woods lies in the natural 
harmony between Statecraft in a nation-State and comparative advantage.  We agree with 
scholars such as Ruggie that from a political standpoint, Bretton Woods worked well for 
101
  See, generally, Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States:  An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and 
the Politics of Nationalism 1 (1977); Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question 8 (I. 
Tovstukha trans., International Publishers, n.d.); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understanding 89-113 (1994), which aptly entitles the chapter on the meaning of "nation" and related terms 
"Terminological Chaos"; E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
1-13 (1990); Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the 
Politics of Nationalism 5 (1977); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism 58-69 (1993).  This is true even though, 
under Marxist theory, the nation-state would ultimately wither away in favor of an international workers 
rule.
102
 Cf. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983); Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism (1971).
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modern liberal democracies.103  We agree with Keynes that, without the delicate poetry of 
Bretton Woods, the modern liberal democracies might not have accepted the GATT as 
they did.104  We accept the economists’ account of comparative advantage as a better 
norm for the trading world in the 20th century than mercantilism.105  However, our story 
is about Statecraft, as a set of ideas and concepts and as the concrete manifestation of 
those ideas in the domestic and international realms, and in the ladder that links them.  
We submit that, in the realm of pure ideas and their manifestation in the economic reality 
of the states, the modern liberal democracies had, by 1917, sufficient evidence of the 
need for a trade constitutional moment to hold Bretton Woods then, in lieu of the Treaty 
of Versailles, but only as the next stage of the evolution of Statecraft and the order of 
states.
By then the nation-state, and the internal economic order that it had generated, 
resulted in an industrialized world subdivided into discrete national economies, a nation 
owning virtually all means of production within the territory governed by each nation-
state, the welfare of the nation as the legitimating drive of the State, and states having (as 
a result of these phenomena) the means and the incentive to regulate and control the 
domestic realm.106  The very elements that changed the nature of Statecraft, from a State 
supported by then nation to a State harnessing itself to the nation, were reflected in the 
103 See JOHN G. RUGGIE, Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes, in 
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLICY:  ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1998);
104
   See Howse, supra note 81.
105 See, e.g., Paul R. Krugman, A Loss of (Theoretical)  Nerve:  The Narrow and Broad Arguments for 
Free Trade, 83 Am.U.L.Rev. 62 (1993).  See also JACQUES MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001).
106
 See Hart, supra note [50].
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domestic reality.107  Unlike today,108 the main assets of each state lay in the hands of the 
nation.  Industrial, agricultural and other output could be characterized, on a consistent 
basis, with the nation.  The trading world could be subdivided into blocs, each of which 
was comprised of an aggregate of goods, capital, assets, currency and other resources that 
in a real sense belonged to the nation.  The presence of these resources enabled the State 
to maintain a substantial degree of control over the nation, and to implement welfare 
policies of the type acknowledged by Bretton Woods.  These were the concrete 
manifestations of Statecraft as a set of ideas.  Given these circumstances, and the ideas 
upon which they rested, the foundational norms of the trade order of states had to change.
The interwoven and dynamic architecture of Statecraft and the order of states had 
generated a clearing for a new constitutional moment by 1917.  The solidification period 
that preceded the Bretton Woods world was marked by relatively mercantilist and inward 
oriented policies that made good sense at the time.109  Inward looking policies, whether 
on an international or a domestic realm, created a nation-State architecture.  This 
architecture made the very order of states that generated it obsolete and created a need for 
107
   See Hart, supra note [50].
108
  “Today we face a new reality. Advances in transportation and communications technology have made it 
possible to breach the territorial, social and cultural integrity of the nation-state on a daily basis. The 
convergence of popular cultures and the crisis of the welfare state all point to the need to develop a new 
definition of sovereignty as well as a new set of norms and rules for inter-state relations. In short, we need a 
new set of rules that recognizes that the realm of goods, services, capital and technology has largely 
escaped from the effective regulation of the territorial nation-state, while its people remain largely attached 
to it.” Id.
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 The story of course has important nuances and, while mercantilism prevailed until the opening years of 
the 19th century, liberalized policies and treaties were entered into before Bretton Woods.  The 
transformative mechanisms set in motion by Bretton Woods, however, generated such a radical 
metamorphosis of the legal and economic frameworks for trade that we may accept that milestone as a 
constitutional moment that breathed legal and institutional life to the economic theories of Ricardo and 
Adam Smith.   See, generally, Milton L. Myers, The Soul of Modern Economic Man: Ideas of Self-Interest, 
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a new constitutional moment.  Bretton Woods became necessary, not because it was the 
height of human organizational evolution, but because a new stage, born out of the 
metamorphoses of the prior era, had arrived. Alas, Bretton Woods ushered in the 
constitutional moment, but too late, and only for the next stage of history.110
An understanding of the state of Statecraft in 1917 would have enabled the 
trading states to grasp the constitutional moment of Bretton Woods closer to the time 
when it became ripe.  By then, it made sense to shake off completely the lingering habit 
of following mercantilist policies that, in light of the advent of a collectivity of nation-
states divided along economic lines coextensive with the nation, had become increasingly 
obsolete.  Before World War I, it was not necessarily unreasonable for states to engage in 
a self-interested trade policy.  To be sure, mercantilist policies may be explained by 
various other theories, such as the capture of politicians by narrow economic interests 
that do not maximize the welfare of the nation.  True, mercantilist policies were tempered 
by various treaties and arrangements that were based on free trade concepts, and 
commercial actors from various states of course conducted business together. However, 
the collectivity of states was not ready before 1917 to institutionalize the principle of 
comparative advantage and generally open up borders to trade because neither the 
process of internal solidification nor the outward quest for resources accorded with 
policies of liberalization of international commerce.   When these very processes yielded 
modern liberal democratic states dedicated to enhancing the welfare of a “nation” that 
had matured in the course of supporting the state and that had control over were 
essentially national industries and means of production, it made sense for these states to 
110 See Jean Monnet Program Materials, The Grammar and Syntax of Trade, Unit I, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/wto/PDF-files/WTO_2004_UnitI.pdf (quoting WTO arguments that 
peace is a function of trade cooperation and dispute resolution).
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shift the international trade components of their Statecraft to incorporate the tenets of 
Smith and Ricardo.
In other words, in the inter-War period, when both fascism and communism were 
still viable alternatives, states that affiliated themselves with modern liberal democratic 
ideals faced a transformed domestic landscape that made a change from mercantilist-
oriented policies to policies such as those effected by Bretton Woods both possible and 
desirable.  A relatively substantial middle class, and a working class whose condition was 
steadily improving, formed the core of the nation.  The State was shifting in its quest for 
legitimacy from harnessing the nation to solidify itself to harnessing itself to provide for 
the nation’s welfare.  The world of modern liberal democracies came to be divided into 
units of economic activity coextensive with these nations.  The State had control over 
internal matters related to the welfare of the nation.  To accept comparative advantage as 
a trade generating principle, within a system where domestic control was needed and 
feasible, was the logical order of states given the state of Statecraft.  In hindsight, it is 
clear that the demise of the mercantilist system that occurred at Bretton Woods, and that 
was further effectuated through the Marshall Plan and the gradual rise of European 
Community, should have occurred at the end of World War I, together with (or better yet 
instead of) the Versailles Treaty.  If it did not, it was in part because of a lingering habit 
of following a model that evolved in an era that featured Statecraft principles that had 
become obsolete, and the failure to step out of that habit to look at Statecraft and its 
relationship with the order of states.
The last pieces of the Statecraft puzzle lie in the concept of balance of powers and 
in the connection between strategy, war and the trade order of states.  The modern world 
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that Cooper describes includes balance of powers as an essential feature.111  A multipolar 
world of solidified nation-states rests on a balance of powers among its constituent 
entities.  In the trade world, this phenomenon is also replicated, and here again the 
Bretton Woods moment may be understood as recognizing, albeit too late, that 
phenomenon.  Bretton Woods joined the theory of comparative advantage with 
substantial cross-Atlantic investment into sovereign, and democratic, blocs in Western 
Europe (and Japan) as part of the Marshall Plan.  The new trade system respected borders 
and sovereignty, and it allowed states to advance national welfare through internal 
policies.  The Marshall Plan’s infusion of capital into Europe created trading partners 
whose economic strengths would enable them to maintain the requisite balance of 
powers.112  In other words, the Bretton Woods/Marshall Plan system was comprised of 
trading “nations,” organized as states, who had economic powers sufficient to check one 
another and who would remove barriers to trade while respecting one another’s national 
sovereignty.
The commercial system put in place at Bretton Woods also accorded with the 
strategic and political needs of the World War II victors.  We are unlikely to ever know 
whether fascism might have been defeated earlier if Bretton Woods and the Marshall 
Plan had been adopted instead of Versailles.  Whether Schuman was right when he 
famously declared that binding the European warriors to a partnership would be the only 
way to peace, or whether Cooper is right that fascism had to die a natural death as an idea 
111 COOPER, supra note 8, at 23-26.
112 See Robert Hall, International Economic Co-operation after 1945, 33 HISTORY TODAY 12, 13 (Dec. 
1983).
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before democracy would prevail,113 we will never know.  The point, though, is that the 
failure of the world trade system to identify early the need to rethink its foundational 
principles, and the direction of trade, did not give trade a chance to further peace.
This was the commercial framework that prevailed from the First World War until 
the defeat of communism. Far from being the “end of history,” however, the modern 
liberal democracies’ triumph has simply ushered in a new era of struggle.  History seems 
to have a habit of giving mortals a brief respite between crises.  The “roaring twenties” 
preceded the advent of fascism and Hitler’s rise to power.114 The “optimistic nineties,” 
marked by a relative era of peace, prosperity, and the illusory faith that globalization 
could promote worldwide democracy and economic growth, are clearly being followed 
by another dark era, marked not by initial public offerings and young globetrotting 
idealists, but by deeply pernicious and diffuse threats.  The parallel is striking.  Now, as 
then, Statecraft faces a transformed landscape and moving forces, which demand a 
reevaluation of trade policy and an adjustment of the international commercial order of 
States for a new era.
113 COOPER, supra note 8, at 52-55.
114 See generally Ray Unger, This Isn't Your Grandfather's Recession, at 
http://www.ungercap.com/articles/111601.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
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III:  Trade and the Needs of the 21st Century
Part II posits that the Bretton Woods order of states arose out of the evolution of 
Statecraft within the collectivity of nation-states that entered into the Treaty.  At its core, 
the structural system that Bretton Woods put in place relied on the rejection of 
protectionism.   Removing barriers to trade would enable specialization in products 
where each nation has a comparative advantage.  The institutionalization of comparative 
advantage would increase the global pie.  In the domestic realm, trade restrictions would 
no longer be used as a means of achieving a wealth transfer objective.  This accorded 
with principles of good governance in that international rules would prevent national 
governments from caving in to protectionist domestic pressures, thereby compelling  
states to follow the system that best served the welfare of the nation.  As Ruggie noted, 
the system also worked in harmony with liberal democratic political organization because 
the constituent states could maintain domestic organization all the while entering into a 
treaty that would increase the resources available to foster that organization.115
We submit that the GATT theoretical framework was a time-bound function of
Statecraft in the generation of the nation-state: The State harnessed itself to the nation.  
Its legitimating drive focused on the improvement of the nation’s welfare, which 
expressed itself through wealth redistribution and other policies that varied from state to 
state.116  Comparative advantage, as expressed through a trade-liberalizing order of states, 
complemented domestic control over these policies in that it generated additional 
115 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
116 See BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 208-209.
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resources for redistribution regardless of the exact contours of the domestic system that 
was put in place.117  Put otherwise, Bretton Woods established a modern order of states 
consistent with the solidified State that lies at the core of modern Statecraft.  However, 
Bretton Woods did not signal the end of trade history.  Rather, it belatedly ushered in a 
trade order of states that set in motion interconnected transformative movements that 
were bound to ultimately usher in a new constitutional period.  Our claim is that the time 
has come for a new constitutional moment to usher in that period.
In this Part III, we proceed in three steps.  First, we explain the successive 
generations of trade issues that the GATT (and later the WTO) faced, through the lens of 
modern Statecraft and the order of states.  Next, we argue that the Bretton Woods trade 
system was bound to generate a transformation of Statecraft from modern to post-modern 
which, over time, would result in the erosion of comparative advantage as the 
foundational norm of the system and require a new constitutional norm and moment.  Our 
claim here is that Bretton Woods, which was born out of the solidification of the State, 
generated an international order that (ironically) was bound in time to weaken the State 
and necessitate a passage to a new constitutional era.  We then identify the “enablement 
of global economic opportunity” as the new foundational norm for the system, to be 
superimposed on comparative advantage in overhauled substantive and institutional 
frameworks that a new constitutional moment should usher in.  
The upshot of our argument is also three-fold:   (i) first, history never ends, and 
the interdependent mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states will, in each 
generation, usher in the need for revising the international commercial order and have a 
117
  As explained above this allowed the constituent states to follow various policies intended to achieve the 
welfare of the nation, such as cradle to grave systems in France or indicative planning in Japan.  See supra
notes __ to __.
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new constitutional moment; (ii) second, theoreticians and planners of trade can predict 
not only the issues that a trade system will generate at any moment in history, but also 
decipher and anticipate the contours of the next generation, if they understand the 
mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states.  (ii) third, each constitutional moment is 
bound to set in motion transformative mechanisms that essentially plant the seeds of the 
succeeding generation, and the time has come for a new constitutional moment of trade.
A. The Bretton Woods World.
Bretton Woods inherited and shaped a world subdivided into national economies 
coextensive with the nation-states that established the trade order of GATT.  The 
theoretical foundation of the system respected sovereignty, left it to internal domestic 
policy to control the redistribution of wealth, and removed trade restrictions as 
protectionist tools from the panoply of government interventionist policies.  Fiscal policy, 
monetary control, welfare enhancing mechanisms and other means of domestic control 
over redistributive justice were, at least in theory, left untouched.  The solidified states 
that comprised the system had the ability to control and manage their economies.  They 
acted on the international scene as the agents of their national industries, and the primary 
interlocutors of trade.  They gave their national industries access to new markets, 
controlled foreign producers’ access to domestic markets, lowered prices for their 
consumers, and operated in a system that allowed them to promote the welfare of the 
nation and achieve their legitimating drive.118
Looking at the Bretton Woods order of states after World War II through the lens 
of Statecraft in the nation-state, a theoretician of trade could have articulated the principal 
118 See, generally,  KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, GATT-THINK (Nat’ Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Discussion Paper No. 8005 (2000).
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legal and structural issues that would face the system over the next decades.  The 
principal elements of Statecraft were welfare, the nation, and sovereignty.119  Each was 
tested, predictably, by the GATT order of states.  Trade 101 teaches that the removal of 
barriers to cross border flow of goods and services causes friction among the domestic 
policies of the constituent states.120  The friction stems from the disparity in regulatory 
environment that obtain within those states.  It is not possible to import a product 
without, to some extent, importing the regulatory environment in which it was made.  A 
Korean automobile worker may make one-tenth of the income that a Detroit worker 
would have earned for a similar product.  He or she may work in a factory where 
occupational safety standards lag far behind those of the United States and Michigan.  
When an American dealer imports cars manufactured under these conditions, they 
essentially dilute the United States labor and occupational safety legislation to the extent 
of the market share of the Korean automobile industry.  
The important trade cases that the GATT and its WTO successor faced reflect the 
friction between the economic control policies of the nation-states.  Scholars often use the 
vague prism of “sovereignty” to capture the battles that have taken place.121  Trade may 
erode sovereignty, the analysis goes, because it thrusts in the name of economic laissez 
faire and liberalism laxer regulatory standards onto the domestic sphere.  Trade rules, for 
119 See COOPER, supra note 8, at 6-10, 21-27.
120 See generally See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated 
Concept, 97 A.J.I.L. 782 (2003); Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 40-54 (2000).
121 See Jeffrey Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 451 (2001); Kal Raustialia, 
Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Building Global 
Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223 (2000); Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, 
Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555 (1999).
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example, may be invoked to attempt to compel France to accept asbestos products 
lawfully marketed in Canada or higher hormone content in meat products that comply 
with United States standards.122  It may deprive the United States of the tools to protect 
sea turtles and dolphins against unconcerned fishing undertakings.123 It may prevent 
Japan from protecting a disfavored minority that specializes in leather products that the 
rest of the world can manufacture more cheaply.124  It will cause Western workers to lose 
jobs to countries where protection of labor runs low on the scale of priorities.125
We submit that these issues are not “absolute” issues facing the trade world, but 
they had significance principally because they arose in a trading system where Statecraft 
122 See WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135abr_e.pdf. The Appellate Body upheld the panel's Article 
XX(b) ruling, which preserved France's right to ban asbestos. The Body rejected Canada's argument that 
France had insufficient scientific evidence to show that asbestos posed a significant risk to human health 
and held that no arbitrary discrimination against Canada had occurred. See also WTO Appellate Body 
Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, (98-0099), AB-1997-4, 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 5 (Jan. 16, 1998) ¶¶ 1-3, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/hormab.pdf.
123 See WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
38 I.L.M. 118, 118 (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf. In 
the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Appellate Body ruled that the claim of India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand 
against a United States law, which prohibited the import of shrimp from countries that typically harvested 
shrimp with methods that killed sea turtles, that is, without using specific turtle-excluding devices. was 
successful under Article XX(g) because the law was a form of "unjustifiable discrimination" because it 
required that the U.S. certify the nations wanting to import shrimp. See also supra text accompanying note 
68; Chang, supra note 93.
124 See Report of Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, L/5623 - 31S/94 (May 16, 1984), 
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/japanleatherIII.pdf; see also S.M. Pekkanen, 
Aggressive Legalism: The Rules of the WTO and Japan’s Emerging Trade Strategy, THE WORLD 
ECONOMY, vol. 24, iss. 5, 707-37 (May 2001)., pp. 707-737(31).
125 See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early
Experience, TEX. INT'L L.J. 32, no.2 (1997)(discussing in part the Side Agreement on Labor of NAFTA); 
see also John J. Audley, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Sandra Polaski and Scott Vaunghan, NAFTA’s
Promise and Reality: Lessons from Mexico for the Hemisphere, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, November 2003; available at www.ceip.org/pubs; Marley Weiss, Two Steps 
Forward, One Step Back — Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, 
Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and Beyond, U. S.F. L. REV., Vol. 37, No. 689 (2003); Jose 
E. Alvarez, Critical Race Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter 11, 28 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303 (1997).  
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was defined by welfare, sovereignty and the nation.  To illustrate our point, let us start 
with a far-fetched hypothetical.  Imagine a world where the main elements of Statecraft 
relate to the State’s ability to protect its subjects against physical harm, and where there is 
no regulation of economic life.126  Assume that, as in the 20th century, each state had 
industries that are essentially national in nature, but that fostering the welfare of the 
nation was not a legitimating drive of states.  Nonetheless, through market forces, certain 
states achieved a voluntary level of labor, environmental, health and safety protection that 
matches that of the Western nation-states of the 20th century.  In other states, no such 
welfare standards apply.  If the GATT operated in such a world, there would be no need 
for states to address the tension among regulatory environments, because (put simply) 
there would be no regulatory environments.  While discrete industries may change their 
practices in response to market forces, or ask for protectionist measures to shelter their 
voluntary practices, the states would not have a vital interest in combating lesser 
standards because the welfare of the nation would not be part of their legitimating drive.  
In the GATT modern world, however, the State’s promotion of welfare is an essential 
element of Statecraft and the tension, between States rather than between domestic 
policies and trade, is bound to arise.
The entire GATT and WTO framework, and the interpretive issues and dispute 
resolution institutions that they spawned, can be explained by looking at it through this 
prism.  In the cases that dominate the trade literature, domestic policies from the state’s 
panoply of nation-welfare promotion come under challenge.  These policies include 
126
  Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1918)(full essay available at 
http://ssr1.uchicago.edu//PRELIMS/Theory/weber.html#WEBER8.
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labor, health, consumer, environmental and conservation regulatory frameworks.127  In all 
instances, the states vied to lose as little control as possible over their ability to enhance 
legitimacy through the relevant policies.  The hermeneutics of the GATT and WTO 
decisions focused heavily on the need to shelter sovereignty, and on deciphering a 
justification for infringing on the aspects of Statecraft that are essential to the nation-
state.  The battle took place on a state-to-state level, because allowing private party 
access would, as was the case in Europe, would unsettle Statecraft.   The common 
denominator of the cases was their focus on the extent to which a state may reject another 
state’s policies by denying import of a product manufactured or marketed in violation of 
rules of the importing state that are essential to Statecraft in the nation-state.128
In other words, the essential elements of Statecraft in the modern world drove the 
main interpretive issues of the GATT/WTO.  Bretton Woods took on a world divided into 
127 Compare, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004) 
with John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 
(2000).
128 In the European Union, the European Court of Justice faced essentially the same questions as the 
GATT/WTO.  It had to decide whether France could apply its worker safety rules, which relied on 
automation more than on training, to block the import of German woodworking machines. Case 188/84, 
Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 419. It had to decide whether England could properly apply its 
obscenity laws to ban the import of Danish pornography. Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn, 1979 E.C.R. 3795. It 
ruled on the legality of applying German liquor content standards to ban the importation of French spirits 
with a slightly lower alcohol content. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung (Cassis de 
Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649. It had to determine whether various consumer protection rules, including bans on 
advertising deemed deceptive, could be applied by member states against materials and products lawfully 
marketed elsewhere in the Union. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-267-68/91, Criminal Proceedings Against 
Keck, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097, available at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm.  In virtually all 
instances, the European Court was asked to determine whether a member state could apply the regulatory 
framework that put in place its specific view of Statecraft in the nation-state.  These cases generated 
enormous scrutiny, and substantial criticism, because (we claim) they pitted against one another the 
disparate views of the European states on how best to achieve welfare for their respective nations.  
Significantly, the European Court adopted a “presumption of mutual reciprocity.”  Provided that the 
products at issue had been lawfully marketed somewhere in the Union, the Court would infuse its analysis 
with a presumption that the importing state could not ban them.  This presumption reflected the assumption 
that the member states, albeit in different ways, had an essentially comparable approach to promoting the 
welfare of the nation and, on a more fundamental level, that Europe had set out to become one nation.  
Nevertheless, where the European Court believed that the policy at issue was an essential element of the 
welfare panoply of the defending State, it upheld the policy and left it to the gradual harmonization process 
of the European Union to eliminate disparities among regulatory environments
49
national, discrete economic blocs.  Its interpretation, put simply, focused on how best to 
protect the regulatory borders of these blocs.  
In addition, the institutional and dispute resolution structure of the GATT/WTO 
also arose out of Statecraft in the modern world.  Unlike Europe, the GATT/WTO 
established a State-to-State system of dispute resolution.  Until the establishment of the 
Dispute Settlement Body, defending states had the option to reject adverse decisions.129
Even after this rule was reversed, and a system of trade tribunals with the hallmarks of 
Western courts was established, states were substantially sheltered from challenges by the 
natural tendencies of governments to use limited legal resources sparingly and to avoid 
legal challenges to other states out of concern that their own non-compliance might be 
attacked in retaliation.130  The upshot of the system was to give its members a substantial 
ability to “selectively exit” its tenets.131  Sovereignty, understood as the ability to 
maintain control over policies intended to foster the welfare of the nations, could be 
protected to a much larger extent than in a system of judicial remedies such as that of the 
129 See John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement
Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AJIL (January 2004); John Jackson, 
Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AJIL (2004) 782-802.
130 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 256-57 (7th ed., 1997) (providing an 
overview of the espousal doctrine); Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven: Some Pragmatic Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMPARATIVE L. REV. 311, 317-19 nn. 27-28 (2000) (discussing some of the obstacles to bringing state-to-
state claims under the espousal doctrine).
131
  Weiler, supra note 77, at 2411-12 (stating, “[t]he 'closure of selective Exit' signifies the process 
curtailing the ability of the Member States to practice a selective application of the acquis communautaire, 
the erection of restraints on their ability to violate or disregard their binding obligations under the Treaties 
and the laws adopted by Community institutions.")
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European Union, where individuals have the virtually unfettered ability to enforce the 
trade norms against domestic rules.132
B. Jacob’s Ladder Revisited:  The Metamorphosis of the Bretton Woods World.
The  Bretton Woods order, in conjunction with other factors, generated 
foundational shifts in domestic Statecraft and a transformed international economic 
landscape.  We posit that the Bretton Woods world has so fundamentally changed that a 
new constitutional moment is now at hand.  In this subpart, we outline the 
metamorphoses that we believe are ushering in the new constitutional era.  In the next 
subpart, we will delineate the contours of this era, and the foundational norms and 
institutional framework that should be put in place.
The world can no longer be viewed as a subdivision of national economies 
coextensive with the nation-states shored up by national middle classes and other 
segments of the population that own means of production that are essentially national in 
nature.   The GATT/WTO opened up borders to trade in goods and services.  The 
constitutional moment of Bretton Woods can be captured by the concept of openness that 
comparative lies at the root of comparative advantage.  The very language of trade, which 
relies on fundamental notions such as “market access,” “cross border flow of goods,” or 
“removal of barriers,” reflects the establishment of an international system where discrete 
132 We can also see this principle at work in GATT provisions such as the Safeguards Agreement.  
Recognizing that international trade patterns may have sudden adverse consequences upon domestic 
industry, the GATT Agreement on Safeguards was drafted to offer domestic government a way to escape 
their trade obligations and offer relief to the affected industry by allowing the domestic authority to 
implement temporary tariffs. The safeguard measures are intended as extraordinary measures to be used in 
emergency situations, and a domestic authority's decision to invoke the Safeguards is subject to review by 
the Dispute Settlement Body. Despite its narrow purpose, the broad language of the Agreement creates the 
potential for abuse, allowing protectionism to flourish under the guise of legality.
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markets will tend to integrate into a global marketplace.  In that marketplace, goods will 
be freely exchanged, by consumers as well as producers.
The national nature of the means of production is bound to erode as a result of an 
order such as that installed by Bretton Woods. Domestic producers will elect to purchase 
components necessary for their output, or simply products for domestic resale, from 
jurisdictions that have a comparative advantage.  That cross border import is the 
archetypal activity that Bretton Woods contemplates.  The story, however, will not end 
there.  Domestic manufacturers will in all likelihood seek to acquire equity or other 
stakes in the enterprises from which they buy, so as to increase their profit margins.  
Conversely, sellers will seek to participate in the profits of the companies that import 
their products.  Further, the Bretton Woods world was bound (as it did) to increase the 
incidence of joint ventures and other cross border partnerships.133  The openness and 
sheer magnitude of the markets, and the increased competition that liberalized trade 
generates, makes such enterprises an inevitable part of commercial life.  
The overlapping of ownership and the spread of production has made it 
increasingly difficult to identify a particular product as belonging to one nation versus 
another. A handbag manufactured in China, designed in Italy, bearing a French Brand, 
and marked as “Made in Italy” is not a product of any particular country, whatever rules 
of origin might have to say about its classification for tariff purposes.  DaimlerChrysler 
manufactures cars that traditionally were viewed as quintessentially German (such as 
Mercedes Benz) and American (such as Jeep).  The company entered into a strategic 
alliance with Mitsubishi Motors and as a result it also markets brands that have been 
133 See CHARLES W.L. HILL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, 
ch.10 (2003)(the effects of the Bretton Woods system includes the facilitated creation and subsequent 
increase in international joint ventures and partnerships).
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associated with Asia.134  Its one billion shares, it goes without saying, are owned by 
investors from all continents.  The phenomenon obtains even on a small scale:  New 
York’s Garment District has shifted its production en masse from Brooklyn to the Far 
East.  These U.S. garment manufacturers began the shift by shipping materials for 
fabrication, and later they came to acquire factories or enter into strategic alliances with 
their producers.  Conversely, the Far East manufacturers have increasingly acquired 
stakes in their clients.  
This transformation of economic activity was compounded by the revolution in 
global communications that the trading world experienced.  The steel mill, textiles plant, 
or agricultural field of the 20th century have now been replaced by a computer 
workstation that can be run from virtually anywhere in the world.  Microchips can be 
manufactured in Silicon Valley from computer software including codes written in India 
that, in the aggregate, can be compared to a factory in their complexity.135  Transcription 
services can be outsourced via access service provider software to the Philippines.136  An 
American appellate brief can be researched and written in Jamaica, and filed by a 
licensed attorney in Camden, New Jersey.  Increased trade and competition were bound 
to generate innovation, and the communications breakthroughs that came about furthered 
134 DaimlerChrysler, Hyundai, and Mitsubishi Motors to Form Global Engine Alliance, Top Story
(Seoul/Stuttgart/Tokyo, May 05, 2002)(available at http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/dccom/0,,0-5-7153-1-
9426-1-0-0-0-0-0-8-7145-0-0-0-0-0-0-1,00.html) ; see also Courtship of Giants, TIME, Business Notes 
(Mar. 19, 1990)(available at http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,969608,00.html).
135 The new geography of the IT industry, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 17, 2003); see also How countries go 
high-tech, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 8, 2001)(available at www.economist.com)(discussing outsourcing of IT 
technology to India).
136
  Press Release, Philippines to showcase IT services edge in outsourcing expo, E-SERVICES-PHILIPPINES, 
available at http://www.e-servicesphils.com/mediaroom.php?mrid=16
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the establishment of a global marketplace where the phenomenon of discrete national 
economies has eroded.  
In the course of the metamorphosis of the Bretton Woods world, the State lost 
control over fundamental tools of wealth transfer and protection of the domestic economy 
that the Bretton Woods order contemplated would stay within the domestic Statecraft 
realm.  Monetary policy, for example, is increasingly escaping control by states.  The 
sheer magnitude of markets for currencies is gradually resulting in the transformation of 
money from a tool of exchange, which can be manipulated domestically, to a mere 
commodity.137  Public debt is increasingly being held by foreign actors, and is being 
regulated more by the interplay of commercial interests than by domestic choices.  A 
simplified and simplistic example is the relationship between the United States and 
Japan.  The United States has for a long time been a main purchaser of Japanese goods, 
and Japan a main purchaser of U.S. debt.  While of course the United States has a 
continuing ability to self-finance its debt, over time this phenomenon may extend to new 
actors on the international scene, including prominently China, with a resulting decrease 
in domestic control.138
137 Michael Burawoy, "The Great Involution: What is Russia and Where Is It Going?" Lecture at Yale 
University (Sept. 24, 1999)(working paper, THE GREAT INVOLUTION:
RUSSIA’S RESPONSE TO THE MARKET, available at
http://sociology.berkeley.edu/faculty/burawoy/burawoy_pdf/involution.pdf); see also Erin Ihde, To Bank or 
Not to Bank: Edward Smith Hall on Free Trade and the Commodification of Money in Early New South 
Wales, J. AUSTRALIAN STUDIES, v. 83 (2004). 
138 Working paper, Michael Burawoy, Transition Without Transformation: Russia's Involutionary Road to 
Capitalism, U.C. Berkeley (available at
http://sociology.berkeley.edu/public_sociology/public_sociology_pdf/Burawoy.pdf)(Discussing China, 
Russia and the commodification of money). 
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This loss of control, which arises out of the impact of the trade order of states on 
the domestic realm, undermines states’ ability to provide for the welfare of the nation in 
the same manner as they did in the 20th century.  At the same time, as described in Part I, 
the states’ ability to muster domestic resources to sustain their welfare on a domestic 
level is being challenged.  The upshot is that the welfare of the nation is fading away as 
an essential component of Statecraft and legitimating drive of states.  This pillar of the 
Bretton Woods world is becoming a secondary policy objective, which is bound to 
gradually fade away as the 21st century advances.
Concurrent with this phenomenon, sovereignty and balance of powers are also 
being eroded.  As a result of the global marketplace that Bretton Woods has wrought, the
21st century has inherited a multipolar economic world resting on a global middle class 
spread across the North and the South.  Brazil, India, China, and South Korea, to cite a 
few, have increasingly become world economic centers.  The output of the non-OECD 
countries has reached 45% today, and is expected to reach 60% by 2015.139  The old 
Second World, made up of communist countries, is being replaced by a new Second 
World comprised of economies formerly classified under the global heading of 
“developing countries.”   Lying within and alongside the first (post-modern) and second 
(modern) economies are pre-modern collectivities of people that lack the education, 
infrastructure and other conditions to benefit from the liberalization of trade that the 
WTO has brought about.  These may live in Brazilian shantytowns, in Afghan mountains 
or in the “excluded” neighborhoods that surround Paris.  The bottom line, though, is that 
139
  International Economy and Prospects for Developing Countries, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, ch. 
1(2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INGEP2003/Resources/gep2003chap1.pdf
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the main interlocutors of trade are no longer national middle classes represented by their
states; rather the trading world is comprised of a diffuse middle class, spread out in a 
multipolar economic configuration, that economists estimate to amount to a collectivity 
of 800 million people surrounded by those who not become meaningful participants in 
the global marketplace.140
The metamorphosis of Bretton Woods means that the world trade system’s 
conceptual tool for understanding itself (an aggregation of nation-states governed by the 
sovereignty, welfare and balance of powers principles of the 20th century) is eroding.  
The erosion of the nation-state and the nation’s welfare as the legitimating drive for the 
State, the gradual decline of the model of a world subdivided into national economies, 
and the transformation of the means of productions, mean that comparative advantage 
can no longer be the sole animating norm of the world’s trading system.  Our thesis is 
that a new constitutional moment is needed to usher in a trade norm that and institutions 
that will supplement Bretton Woods.  In the next subpart, we outline the contours of this 
norm, which we describe as the “enablement of global economic opportunity” and of the 
institutions that will need to be put in place to implement it.
C.  The Enablement of Global Economic Opportunity.
i.  The Norm.
The enablement of global economic opportunity is a norm that would accord with 
a diffuse marketplace that has moved away from a world comprised of discrete economic 
140 See Daniel R. Fung, Constitutional Reform in China: The Case of Hong Kong, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 467, 
468 (2004) (“China is creating a whole new strata of sophisticated middle class urbanites … that is 
unprecedented in certainly China's history, and, arguably, world history in terms of the life transformation 
of sheer numbers of people.”); Tim Larimer, A New Bourgeoisie Develops a Proletarian Taste, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995, at A4 (reporting on a nascent middle class in Vietnam); Alejandro Portes et al., 
Urbanization in the Caribbean Basin: Social Change During the Years of Crisis, 29 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 
3, 21 (1994) (describing the rise of an urban middle class in the Dominican Republic during the 1960s and 
1970s).
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units coextensive with a nation whose welfare the State is dedicated to promote.  Our 
starting point, as with Bretton Woods, is with domestic Statecraft.  The modern nation-
states, we have argued in Part I, are being replaced by a collectivity of post-modern 
states.  Whether they are called “market-states”, “post-modern”, or other label, the 
important substantive component of Statecraft within those states is the replacement of 
the welfare of the nation with the pushing and prodding of economic activity as the 
legitimating drive of the State.  Sovereignty and balance of powers also fade away in the 
world of post-modern states, owing to the diffuseness that characterizes the global 
marketplace.141
We submit that instead of managing welfare, the nation, sovereignty and balance 
of powers, post-modern states will increasingly need to manage diffuseness, foster 
economic opportunity, preserve their middle class, and prod their markets to achieve the 
gradual extension of the middle class and its economic opportunities to the pre-modern 
collectivities.  In turn, just like Bretton Woods established a trade order that accorded 
with the components of Statecraft of the modern states, a new constitutional era should 
usher in a trade order that accord with these transformed elements of Statecraft in the 
post-modern world.   The trade order of states should establish rules, to be superimposed 
on Bretton Woods, which embody the enablement of global economic opportunity, in a 
constitutional rite of passage.  
In many ways, economic opportunity is a logical extension of welfare promotion.  
The solidification of the nation in the state-nation evolutionary stage brought about the 
nation-state. The State’s legitimating drive became the promotion of the welfare of the 
141 COOPER, supra note 8, at 26-42; see also BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 233, 523-527; Peter Drucker, The 
Age of Social Transformation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 53 (Nov. 1994)..
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nation, in a world where sovereign economic units coexisted within a balance of powers 
paradigm. That world brought about an explosion of economic units into a diffuse whole, 
and a resulting weakening of states.  Given the erosion of welfare and of the nation, the 
State’s legitimating drive should logically move on to fostering economic opportunity 
and managing diffuseness.  Unable to foster welfare, deprived of the nation as the object 
of its welfare effort, the State fell back on economic opportunity as its next best 
alternative.
Before we move on to describe the constitutional moment that we advocate, we 
shall explain how the conceptual shift to economic opportunity explains some of the 
current pressures and trends in the Doha negotiations.  The enablement of global 
economic opportunity norm can be deciphered in Doha agenda under the heading of 
market access.  The Doha agenda is dominated by issues often described as related to 
“developing countries.”142  These issues include, among other things, the removal of 
“selective exit” for products such as agricultural goods with respect to which certain 
developing countries have a comparative advantage.  To a certain extent, the enablement 
of global economic opportunity is a function of completing the Bretton Woods enterprise, 
and Doha can be understood as following the tide of history.
The completion of the Bretton Woods enterprise will necessitate some 
institutional overhaul that will go beyond the matters on the Doha agenda. The multi-
polarity and diffuseness of the new world are bound to create new protectionist pressures 
on domestic governments, which the institutional tools of the WTO are not equipped to 
142
   For illustrations involving intellectual property protection, see John O. McGinnis, The Political 
Economy of International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 549 (2003). But cf. Andrew T. 
Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 
933 (2003). For a general statement on the goals of the Doha Round, see supra note 75.
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deal with adequately.  The flow of industry to the multi-polar world is bound to affect 
industries that are sensitive to the economies of the United States, Europe and the other 
main GATT trading partners.  Technology, software, services, and other functions may 
be serviced by developing countries.  At the same time, the extraordinary comparative 
advantage enjoyed in the labor field by actors like China, which may marry low wages 
with educational and other infrastructure, will heighten the pressure to protect the 
domestic competitors in the U.S. and Europe through anti-dumping or safeguard 
measures.143  The pressure on Doha to address development issues that go beyond the 
original, efficiency based goals of the WTO can be explained in part by the rise of the 
enablement of global economic opportunity as a norm of international commerce.  
The action here still takes place within the Doha, but it necessitates a rethinking 
of the norms and institutional structure of the WTO in light of the next generation of 
trade cases that is sure to arise.  The analysis here is akin to that which, as described 
above, could have taken place at Bretton Woods if the trade planners and theoreticians 
had looked at the system through the prism of the interaction between Statecraft and the 
order of states.  From the point of view of the present, future matters and interpretive 
issues will include prominently cases “new protectionism,” driven by domestic demand 
for governments to shelter domestic industry against the cheaper labor/good education 
and infrastructure coming from the new trade actors.  
Regrettably, the WTO is not sufficiently well equipped at the moment to address 
this phenomenon. As explained above, the opening up of barriers to trade among the 20th
century main players resulted in the type of questions that necessitated the establishment 
143
  China, especially, has been impacted by various antidumping policies. For a survey of China’s 
antidumping woes, see Lei Yu, Note, Rule of Law or Rule of Protectionism: Anti-Dumping Practices 
Toward China and the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 293 (2002).
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of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  Today, the new domestic protectionist pressures 
will increasingly take the form of the use and abuse of anti-dumping, countervailing duty 
or other safeguard clauses.  This is a virtually inevitable result of the change in the global 
commercial landscape. Simply put, the sheer number of such cases, as relates to even a 
single country like China, is staggering, and there is no physical way for the DSB to 
handle workload that the new world economy is bound to generate.
The first institutional change that a WTO system infused with the enablement of 
economic opportunity as its animating norm would require, is the establishment of an 
international trade administrative body.  Most important is the extent to which the DSB 
should be supplemented with professional administrative tribunals that would, ex ante, 
review antidumping or safeguard determinations by a national authority.  We should 
inspire ourselves, consistent with the cross fertilization of international norms and 
expertise that Professor Weiler wrote about some time ago, with experiments under the 
NAFTA related to the application of countervailing duties for illegal subsidies, and the 
difficulties (and advantages) inherent in the application of domestic law by supranational 
institutions. Without such a system, the domestic pressures will thwart the spread of the 
enablement of global economic opportunity and, just like trade before World War II, the 
trade system of the WTO will have failed to graduate to a new era characterized by a 
transformed economic and political landscape.
Beyond those adjustments to the WTO, the enablement of global economic 
opportunity requires the trading partners to go beyond the WTO and establish a new set 
of norms and institutions.  In our view the first step towards finding a solution is to 
establish a trade institutional structure of the future that lies outside of the WTO.  The 
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institutional structure must be diffuse, shifting with the needs of the day, in accord with 
Statecraft within the main states that comprise the trading world and the transformed core 
elements of Statecraft in the post-modern world.  The challenge facing the trading 
partners is to establish institutions that will accommodate not just trade between modern 
nation-states, but trade in a post-modern world where diffuse economic by diffuse actors 
generate an astonishing amount of issues.  We believe the solution lies in a division of the 
trade world along industry lines, and the establishment of a set of institutions that is 
described below to address the issues that arise within each subject matter area.  
The diffuseness of the post-modern world has created a global middle class which 
is displacing the nation-state as the true interlocutor of trade.  That middle class may be 
conceptualized as gravitating around a number of discrete industries, each of which raises 
a given set of issues on the global scale.  Compare, for example, the fashion industry and 
the pharmaceutical industry.  The issues of the day in the fashion industry involve the 
displacement of means of production to the Far East and other countries where cheap 
labor abounds.  To respond to competition, the high-end brands are lowering their 
standards to tackle less luxurious markets.  The mid-range brands are being squeezed out 
of their markets from the top by those luxury brands, and by the generic competition that 
come from the Far East.  They are riding the tide, waiting for the new Far East players to 
become importing forces that they can tackle.  These issues require international 
coordination of the type that the WTO cannot possibly supply.  
The same need arises with respect to the pharmaceutical industry, albeit in an 
entirely different context.  There, the salient issues involve the extent to which companies 
operating in certain states should be forced to shoulder health burdens from other states, 
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in particular developing states.  For example, may a generic company operating in India 
reverse engineer a drug made by Merck, and manufacture that drug at a cheaper price?  
Would India have the right to permit the grant of a sublicense to manufacture the same 
drug to, say, an African company?  Again, both industries face issues that require 
international regulation, but in an entirely different context.
We believe that a new trade organization, comprised of a shifting membership 
that is dictated by the industries at issues, should be put into plance.  It should have nine 
permanent trading partners (which we will refer to as the “Trade Commission”).  The 
trading members could be, by way of illustration: the European Union, the United States, 
Brazil or an alliance of South and Latin American States, Australia, India, Indonesia, the 
Arab League, Japan and an alliance of the Southeast Asian “tiger states,” and the African 
Union.   Each of these representatives comes from a region where the post-modern is 
juxtaposed to the modern and pre-modern world.  They could be supplemented by states 
that are important actors in a particular industry, and address the issues that arise in 
connection with that industry.
In each instance, the Commission will establish programs designed to establishing 
the conditions necessary for the enablement of global economic opportunity. It is perhaps 
a cliché to say that a Marshall Plan for 21st century is needed, but when one considers the 
type of educational and infrastructural growth that is needed to promote the move to pre-
modern societies of the type of industries that are spreading to modern societies such as 
India, one can see that realistic training and foundational programs may go a long way 
towards spreading economic opportunity to pre-modern societies.
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Next, the Commission could coordinate with other international institutions.  In 
the examples that we are providing above, the Commission would obviously coordinate 
with the World Health Organization when it comes to pharmaceutical companies, and 
with the International Labor Organization when it comes to fashion and textile.  In 
addition, the norm of enablement of global economic opportunity carries in its penumbra 
other norms, such anti-corruption norms, that could be more effectively enforced by 
cooperation between the Trade Commission and, say, the International Criminal Court. 
The integration of various institutions to handle certain subject matter areas accord with 
the diffuse nature of the post- modern world, and its tendency to allow for supranational 
norms to interfere with domestic sovereignty in order to solve cross-border problems.
The cooperation with other international institutions will also address and rethink 
concept of “trade and…”  It is clear that we still cannot think of trade without thinking of 
the environment, labor, consumer rights, and other potentially conflicting domestic norms 
that grew out of Statecraft in the modern nation-state.  How to handle the 20th century 
generation of trade issues will continue to occupy us for years to come within the 
framework of the WTO.  However, in addition, the post-modern world necessitates that 
we add to this domestic-to-international discussion an “international-to-international” 
discussion.  To take a clear example, monetary policy can no longer be thought about as  
principally a domestic matter, which may require some international cooperation by 
institutions operating independently of the trade governing body.  Lack of control of the 
market driven and other currency fluctuation is intricately linked to the proper flow of 
trade, and it can have a devastating domino effect on a trade system that fails to pay 
attention to it.
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The “trade and …” issues of the post-modern world will involve questions related 
to “trade and international finance,” “trade and national debt” and other “trade and …” 
questions where the other value used to be controlled by a domestic authority, which lost 
in control and left an international vacuum.  For example, the Trade Commission will 
have to regulate, in coordination with central banks and other financial institutions, the 
relative exchange rates of the main trading partners.  The recent fall of the dollar,144 and 
the inability or unwillingness of the traditional domestic institutions to stem the tide, 
could deeply unsettle the trade world.  Europe could lose a substantial market share in the 
United States.  China’s products, priced principally in dollars, could become even 
cheaper than they are now, and more importantly the Chinese consumer would lose a 
substantial amount of buying power vis-a-vis the European partners.  While some 
international institutions do exist to handle those issues, in today’s diffuse world there is 
simply not enough institutional structure to address these issues effectively. 
The shift in the trade world that we are advocating would anticipate and follow 
the historical tide before change is forced upon it (possibly in an atmosphere of crisis).   
While the inner constitutional and outward strategic transformation of the modern states 
does not make Bretton Woods irrelevant (far from it), the liberal democracies must 
recognize the need to adjust their trade strategy.  The new world is diffuse.  Its essential 
players are no longer confined to the West.145  Strategically, the battleground has shifted 
from defeating fascism and communism as alternative theories of the nation-state, to 
defeating existential threats to the post-modern states in the form of terrorism and nuclear 
144 Export Opportunities Aren't Just for the Big Guys, New York Times, March 24, 2005 C.8
145
 See Asaf Sagiv, Globalization:  Just Do It, Azure 85 (2005)(on file with authors)
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takeover.  Sovereignty and balance of powers, which made for a world comprised of 
discrete trading blocs that focused on a nation, are no longer the currency of the day.  
Rather than a “North” and a “South,” we are faced today with diffuse blocs that 
cut across traditional borders, coexist within borders, and form the new stage of our 
political and economic evolution.  From inward look and outward conquest (in the pre-
modern era), via collaboration and creation of a balance bloc of sovereign nations in the 
North (during the modern-era), we are entering a dynamic world where North and South 
blend to create a diffuse society of post-modern states lying side by side with, and 
containing within themselves, pre-modern societies.146
The fundamental challenge of the post-modern society of states will be to 
preserve a world where the trading blocs, within the South and the North, continue to 
grow and to contain countervailing forces – chief among them terrorism, the conduct of 
asymmetric war (especially economic warfare) through terror, and the takeover of a 
nuclear state by rogue forces.  The strategic importance of consolidating a Northern bloc 
of liberal democracies is no longer the top agenda of the day. We believe that, in order 
for trade as the outer face of the state to follow the inner constitutional order of post-
modern societies, and to further their foreign strategic goals, it must be reconfigured to 
accept that the 21st century principal commercial interlocutors are the trading classes of 
the North and the South (and, as mentioned below, the former communist states).  Instead 
of focusing on commerce between sovereign blocs within the North, trade must recognize 
that trading forces within each post-market state are emanating North-South, North-
North, and increasingly “eastward” towards the former communist countries.  
146 Id.
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At the same time, the emerging post-modern societies of the South are surrounded 
by modern and, most importantly, enormous pockets of pre-modern blocs.  These blocs 
cut across state boundaries, and they are bound to be the center of the liberal 
democracies’ strategic security interests.147   A trade system that continues to focus on a 
trading bloc developed out of the modern nation-states’ wars cannot meet the challenges 
of the 21st century.  Put otherwise, the failure to proactively adjust trade to recognize the 
new, diffuse North-South lines, may be viewed in ten, twenty, or thirty years (after we 
have endured a catastrophic event such as a Pakistani-launched nuclear assault or the 
development of a lethal Indonesian terrorist group that is not contained by that state’s 
middle class) as an error of magnitude similar to the Treaty of Versailles.  The infusion of 
a new value and institution to the trade system follows the inner and outer evolution of 
the modern liberal democratic state in the 21st century, before a catastrophic world event 
makes this move obvious, just like Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan did in the 21st
century.  
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Conclusion
Once the global collectivity sets in motion a new trade order of states, it will have 
triggered a new cycle which, like Bretton Woods, will generate novel substantive and 
institutional issues and, over time, transform Statecraft, undergo additional 
metamorphoses of its own, and ultimately give rise to another constitutional era.  History 
in fact never ends, but it pauses sufficiently for each generation to recognize its place in
the evolutionary path, and to organize its law, international order and institutions to 
reflect the needs of the moment.  
In this Article, we have identified constitutional mechanisms that affect Statecraft, 
the order of states and transformative and evolutionary patterns that are borne out of this 
constitutional interaction.  Further, we have articulated what we believe to be the seminal 
contours of the constitutional order of the early 21st century.  Today’s mission is to build 
a system for coming generations, keeping in mind that when we take on the unavoidable 
task of transforming the current order we also plant the seeds of an equally inevitable 
future constitutional metamorphosis.  
It goes without saying that further study, thought and analysis will go into 
creating the architecture, frame and construction of the new system.  Experts in each 
industry will identify the salient needs and submit to policy-makers and negotiators with 
the choices that face them.  Finance and currency thinkers will study the transformed 
international and domestic landscape and produce the nuts and bolts of the new order.  
Institutional theorists will analyze the various means of breathing life to the new norms 
through transformed institutions.  To be sure, the current system will continue to operate, 
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and the comparative advantage enterprise to unfold.  Changes would have to be made on 
this front as well to reflect the transformed nature of the State, such as a revision of the 
rules of origin, balance of payment and other provisions that were devised for a nation-
state centric system.  However, in time, the GATT will have achieved its integration 
purpose, and the central action on the international scene will focus on how best to spread 
global economic opportunity.
The new order will not arise overnight.  When Robert Schuman declared his 
vision of a constitutionally transformed Europe, he pointedly prophesized that Europe 
would be built through a series of “concrete achievements” which, over time, would yield 
a new legal order that he visualized in 1950 as the “United States of Europe.”  The 
interaction of the various European institutions, the resolution of crises such as the 
Luxembourg constitutional breakdown of the 1960a, and the random workings of the 
political process, infused into the system an element of randomness on the road to the 
inevitable result:  its acceptance by the constituent entities.  The same animating 
principles will obtain in the international order of states that we are discussing.  
We can already predict certain developments, albeit with no clear view of their 
timing and exact nature.  With the erosion of the nation-state as the central unit of the 
system, the place of both individuals and private organizations in the international order 
will continue to solidify.  International rules will likely rise in prominence and become  
increasingly available to private parties in actions against one another and against 
institutional players.  New international financing institutions may arise to spread 
economic opportunity to pre-modern areas.  Acceptance of the rule of law may become 
an even greater precondition to participation in the trade order.  Partnership among states, 
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international institutions and private actors will take forms we can only glimpse from the
vantage point of the present.  Borders might have to be redrawn, and states might accept 
economic boundaries that are much broader and more diffuse than their political 
boundaries.  The geographical landscape that we inherited from the colonial era and the 
wars of the 20th century might well become unrecognizable.
The future evolution of states and trade will surely face setbacks if not crises.   
But by paying heed to the evolving course of history, we stand a greater chance to steer it 
towards a better course.  No doubt, we will continue to struggle with poverty, violence, 
terror, inequalities, catastrophes, and all other permanent attributes of the human 
condition.  However, by recognizing the fundamental mechanisms that drive our 
domestic and international orders, we will have done all we can to organize ourselves as 
best as possible to face an uncertain future.
